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Privacy-Preserving Secret Shared Computations
using MapReduce
Shlomi Dolev, Peeyush Gupta, Yin Li, Sharad Mehrotra, Shantanu Sharma
Abstract—Data outsourcing allows data owners to keep their data at untrusted clouds that do not ensure the privacy of data and/or
computations. One useful framework for fault-tolerant data processing in a distributed fashion is MapReduce, which was developed for
trusted private clouds. This paper presents algorithms for data outsourcing based on Shamir’s secret-sharing scheme and for
executing privacy-preserving SQL queries such as count, selection including range selection, projection, and join while using
MapReduce as an underlying programming model. Our proposed algorithms prevent an adversary from knowing the database or the
query while also preventing output-size and access-pattern attacks. Interestingly, our algorithms do not involve the database owner,
which only creates and distributes secret-shares once, in answering any query, and hence, the database owner also cannot learn the
query. Logically and experimentally, we evaluate the efficiency of the algorithms on the following parameters: (i) the number of
communication rounds (between a user and a server), (ii) the total amount of bit flow (between a user and a server), and (iii) the
computational load at the user and the server.
Index Terms—Computation and data privacy, data and computation outsourcing, distributed computing, MapReduce, Shamir’s
secret-sharing. F
1 INTRODUCTION
The past few years have witnessed a huge amount of sensitive
data generation due to several applications, e.g., location tracking
sensors, web crawling, social networks, and body-area networks.
Such real-time data assists users in several ways such as suggest-
ing new restaurants, music, videos, alarms for health checkups
based on the user’s history; hence, it carries a potential threat to
the user’s privacy. MapReduce [2] was introduced by Google in
2004 and has emerged as a programming model for fast, parallel,
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and fault-tolerant processing of large-scale data at a trusted private
cloud. The huge amount of data creates hurdles to process it at a
private cloud due to limited resources. Therefore, data and compu-
tation outsourcing, which move databases and computations from
a trusted private cloud to an untrusted centralized (public) cloud,
become a prominent solution. However, outsourcing jeopardizes
the security and privacy of the data and computations. At present,
due to constraints such as limited network bandwidth and network
latency, uploading data to far sided clouds is not a trivial task,
and edge or fog computing overcomes such a problem to some
extent [3]. However, edge or fog computing also suffers from the
same security/privacy issues in data processing.
Recently, some works based on encryption [4], [5], [6], [7],
[8] and trusted hardware [9], [10] have been proposed to execute
MapReduce computations in a secure and privacy-preserving
manner at the cloud. Encryption-based secure MapReduce tech-
niques [4], [5], [6], [7], [8] provide computationally secure frame-
works but are limited to only count and selection queries on a
non-skewed dataset. These techniques also inherit disadvantages
of encryption techniques. For example, MrCrypt [7], which is
based on homomorphic encryption, may prevent information leak-
age when mixed with ORAM [11], but it incurs a significant
time delay [12], [13]. Prism [5], which is based on searchable
encryption, also leaks the keywords and index traversal. Trusted-
hardware-based MapReduce solutions, e.g., M2R [10], VC3 [9],
which are based on Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [14],
also reveal access-patterns due to side-channel attacks (such as
cache-line, branch shadowing, and page-fault attacks [15], [16])
on SGX. Hence, these solutions are not secure. Also, as stated
in [12], these solutions suffer from information leakage during
intermediate data traversal from mappers to reducers. Thus, the
existing solutions fail to provide completely secure computations
or common SQL (e.g., count, selection, join, and range) queries.
The following example shows that hiding access-patterns and
preventing attacks based on output-size is important to achieve
the data/query security, even if the query is hidden and the data
ar
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is non-deterministically1 encrypted. Consider an employee rela-
tion denoted by E(SSN ,Name) and a cancer hospital relation
denoted by H(SSN ,Name,Treatment). Also, consider that
both relations are stored at a single (public) server2 that may
be an honest-but-curious adversary, which executes the query
correctly but tries to learn more about encrypted data. Assume
a query that finds the employees’ details suffering from can-
cer, i.e., SELECT E.SSN, E.Name FROM E INNER JOIN
H ON E.SSN=H.SSN. Before executing this query, an adversary
is not aware of the number of employees suffering from cancer.
The use of an access-pattern-hiding technique for joining these
two relations can hide the fact which two tuples of the relation
join, i.e., have a common SSN . However, access-pattern-hiding
techniques cannot prevent output-size-based attacks. Thus, after
executing such a query, the adversary can know the number of
employees suffering from cancer based on output-size; thereby,
gains more information than before the query execution.
A completely secure solution must achieve (i) data privacy
(i.e., the data or metadata should not be revealed to the adversary
before/during/after a computation), and (ii) query privacy (i.e., the
user query should be hidden from the database (DB) owner and
the servers).
Contribution
In this paper, our goal is to support privacy-preserving SQL
queries, e.g., select, project, and join, while guaranteeing
information-theoretic data and query privacy. Here, the algorithms
are developed for MapReduce; however, they can be generalized
for the standard database systems and any other frameworks. Our
contribution can be summarized, as follows:
• Information-theoretically secure outsourcing. We provide
Shamir’s secret-sharing (SSS) [17] based information-
theoretically secure data and computation outsourcing technique
that prevents an adversary from knowing the database or the
query. The proposed SSS-based mechanism creates different
shares of multiple occurrences of the same cleartext value,
preventing the frequency-count attack (i.e., finding the number
of tuples containing an identical value). The techniques are
designed in such a way that after outsourcing the DB to servers,
the DB owner does not need to be online during the query
execution.
• Privacy-preserving query execution by third parties. We provide
privacy-preserving algorithms for queries: count (§4.1), selection
(§4.2), project (§4.3.2), join (§4.3), and range (§4.4). The queries
are executed in an oblivious manner so that the adversary cannot
distinguish any two queries and data satisfying (based on access-
patterns) to the queries. Moreover, our proposed approaches do
not reveal the output or the query based on output-sizes. Our
proposed approaches use an existing string-matching technique
on secret-shared, known as accumulating-automata (AA) [18]
that originally supported only count queries.
• Minimum leakage and complex queries. During a MapReduce
computation, an adversary having some background knowledge
can learn some information by observing output-sizes, as shown
in the previous example. Our proposed algorithms minimize
information leakage. We find a relation among the workload
1. Non-deterministic encryption achieves ciphertext indistinguishably, so
that the adversary cannot know which two ciphertexts contain an identical
cleartext, by just observing the encrypted data.
2. Hereafter, the word “server” is used to indicate public/edge servers, since
our proposed algorithms are independent of the type of computing resources.
at the user, the number of communication rounds, and the data
privacy. We will see in §4.2 that in the case of skewed data, as
the user is willing to perform fewer interpolation tasks on the
secret-shared outputs of the servers, information leakage at the
servers increases that may breach the data privacy.
• Analysis of the algorithms. We mathematically and experimen-
tally analyze our algorithms on the following three parameters:
(i) the total amount of dataflow between the user and a server,
(ii) the number of interaction rounds between the user and a
server, and (iii) the computational workload at the user and
the servers. §5 experimentally evaluates communication cost
and computational cost at the server and user. §7 provides
theorems and proofs to show the above three parameters for
each algorithm.
Related Work
An overview of Shamir’s secret-sharing (SSS). SSS [17] is
a cryptographic algorithm developed by Adi Shamir in 1979.
The main idea of SSS is to divide a secret value, say S, into
c non-communicating servers such that no one can know the
secret S until they can collect c′ < c shares, where c′ is the
threshold of SSS. Particularly, the secret owner randomly selects
a polynomial of degree c′ − 1 with c′ − 1 random coefficients:
f(x) = a0 + a1x + a2x
2 + . . . + ac′−1xc
′−1 ∈ FP [x], where
a0 = S, P is a prime number, and FP is a finite field of order
P . The secret owner distributes the secret S to c servers by
placing x = 1, 2, . . . , c in f(x). The secret S is constructed by
performing Lagrange interpolation [19] on any c′ shares. Note that
in this paper we assume c′ = c, since we are not dealing with fault
tolerance or a malicious adversary; however, it will not affect the
algorithm’s design.
An overview of security techniques. PRISM [4], PIRMAP [5],
EPiC [6], MrCrypt [7], and Crypsis [8] provide privacy-preserving
MapReduce computations in the cloud on encrypted data. How-
ever, all these protocols/systems support only count and selection
queries on encrypted data while either incurring significant over-
head in terms of time or do not provide data/query security (as
a tradeoff between preserving data privacy and utility). Details
of security and privacy concerns in MapReduce may be found
in [24]. There are some other encryption-based systems [25],
[26] and trusted hardware-based systems [9], [10], [27], [28] to
execute SQL queries without using MapReduce as a program-
ming model. These systems also result in information leakage
due to deterministic or order-preserving encryption [29], [30]
or limited operations. Searchable techniques are designed for
keyword searches on encrypted or cleartext data. For example,
searchable encryption [31], [32] allows searching on encrypted
data, while function secret-sharing (FSS) [33] allows searching
on cleartext data. Searchable encryption mixed with oblivious-
RAM (ORAM) [11] hides access-patterns, while PIR and FSS hide
access-patterns by default. However, these searchable techniques
are not secure against output-size attacks and/or not information-
theoretically secure. Other work (e.g., [34]) proposed to operate
arithmetic operations over encrypted data, based on specialized
cryptographic techniques. There are work on verifying SQL
queries on outsourced cleartext data, such as IntegriDB [35] and
vSQL [36] (or [37]). We do not describe these systems in detail,
since the paper focuses on MapReduce-based computations.
There is also work on secret-sharing-based query execution,
e.g., [21], [23], [38], [39]. [38] supports privacy-preserving join
using secret-sharing and requires that two different DB owners
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON DEPENDABLE AND SECURE COMPUTING, ACCEPTED 01 AUG. 2019. 3
TABLE 1: Comparison of different algorithms with our algorithms.
Algorithms Communication cost Computational cost # rounds Matching Based on
User Server
Count query
EPiC [6] O(1) O(1) O(n) 1 Online E
Our solution §4.1 O(1) O(1) nw 1 Online SSS
Selection query when one value has one tuple
Chor et al. [20] O(nmw) O(1) O(nmw) log2 n Online SSS
PRISM [4] O((nm) 12w) O((nm) 12w) O(nmw) q E
Our solution §4.2.1 O(mw) O(mw) O(nmw) 1 Online SSS
Selection query when one value has multiple tuples
rPIR [21] O(nm) O(1) O(nmw) 1 No SSS
PIRMAP [5] O(nmw) O(mw) O(nmw) 1 No E
Goldberg [22] O(n + m) O(m) O(nm) 2 Offline SSS
Emekci et al. [23] O(`m) O(`m) O(n) 2 Offline vSS
Our one-round solution: knowing
addresses §4.2.2
O(n) O(n) O(nw) 1 Online SSS
Our tree-based solution: knowing
addresses §4.2.2
O((log` n+log2 `)`) O((log` n + log2 `)`) O((log` n +
log2 `)`nw
) O(blog` nc+blog2 `c) Online SSS
Our solution: fetching tuples §4.2.2 O(`mw) O(`mw) O(`nmw) 1 Online SSS
Join queries
Our solution: Non-PK/FK Join §4.3 O(2nwk + 2k`2mw) O(2nw + 2k`2mw) O(2`2kmw) O(2k) Online SSS
Range queries
Range-based count query: §4.4 O(1) O(1) O(nw) 1 Online SSS
Range-based selection query: §4.4 O(n + `mw) O(n + `mw) O(`nmw) 2 Online SSS
Notations: Online: perform query execution at the server. Offline: perform query execution at the user. E: encryption-decryption based. SSS: Shamir’s
Secret-sharing. vSS: a variant of SSS. n: # tuples, m: # attributes, `: # occurrences of a predicate (` ≤ n), w: bit-length of a word.
share some information for constructing an identical share for
identical values in their relations. However, sharing information
among DB owners is not trivial when they are governed by
different organizations and policies, and moreover, by following
this approach, a malicious DB owner may be able to obtain
another relation. [23] provides a technique for data outsourcing
using a variation of SSS. However, [23] suffers from two major
limitations: (i) in order to answer a query, the DB owner has to
work on all the shares, hence, the DB owner (not the servers)
incurs the overhead of secure computing; and (ii) a third-party
without involving the DB owner cannot directly issue any query
on secret-shares. Also, [23] provides a way to construct polyno-
mials that can maintain the orders of the secrets. However, these
polynomials are based on an integer ring (no modular reduction)
rather than a finite field; thus, it has a potential security risk. There
is also work [20], [21], [22] that provide searching operations on
secret-shares. In [22], a data owner builds a Merkle hash tree [40]
according to a query. In [21], a user knows the addresses of the
desired tuples, so they can fetch all those tuples obliviously from
the servers without searching at the server. Similar ideas can also
be found in [20].
Our proposed algorithms overcome the disadvantages of the
existing secret-sharing-based data outsourcing techniques [20],
[21], [22], [23], [38]. In our approach, (i) unlike [38], the DB
owner do not need and share information, (ii) unlike [23], have
an identical share for multiple occurrences of a value, and (iii)
unlike [23], [39], a third party can directly execute queries in the
servers without revealing queries to the servers/DB owner, and
without involving the DB owner in answering a query.
Table 1 summarizes all the results of this paper and a com-
parison with the existing algorithms, based on the five criteria:
(i) communication cost, (ii) computational cost at the user and
the server, (iii) number of rounds, (iv) matching of a keyword
in an online or offline manner, and (v) dependence of secret-
sharing. Note that in offline string-matching operations, the user
needs to download the whole database and then searches for
the query predicate. Thus, the number of rounds is decreased,
while the communication cost and computational cost at the user
increase. In contrast, online operations refer to a strategy where the
server performs the desired operation without sending the whole
database to the user. From Table 1, it is also clear that our count
query algorithm requires an identical amount of communication
as encryption-based Epic [6]. However, we perform some more
work at the server due to our secret-sharing-based data encoding
technique. In case of a selection query, where one value has only
one tuple, we perform better than existing SSS-based selection
query algorithms in terms of communication and computational
cost. However, when a value has multiple tuples, our algorithms
work as good as existing algorithms; nonetheless, we provide more
secure ways to prevent information leakage. To the best of our
knowledge, there is no prior work on secure join queries using
secret-sharing.
2 THE MODEL
We assume the following three entities in our model; see Figure 1:
Secret-sharing 
Module
Non-communicating 
servers
UsersDatabase 
Owner
Untrusted DomainTrusted 
Domain
Trusted Domain
S
ecret-sh
ared
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ata 
tran
sm
issio
n
1
Cleartext query 
submission
2
Secret-shared 
result transmission
6
Secret-shared query 
transmission
3
4 Query execution
5
Interpolation 
Module
Final results
Fig. 1: The system architecture.
1) The trusted database (DB) owner, who owns a dataset, creates
secret-shares of the dataset, and outsources the ith share to the
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Notations Meaning
c # non-communicating servers holding secret-shares
c′ Threshold of Shamir’s secret-sharing
R A relation (or table) in cleartext
n Number of tuples (or rows) in R
m Number of attributes (or columns) in R
Ai The ith attribute
p A counting/searching predicate
` # occurrences of p
[R]i The ith secret-shared relation [R]
RID Row/Tuple-id attribute
[vi]
k
j The j
th alphabet of the ith secret-shared value [v] at the server k
w Maximum bit-length
Len(x) Length of a sting x
TABLE 2: Notations used in the paper.
ith server ( 1 in Figure 1). An algorithm for creating secret-
shares is described in §2.1.
2) c > 2 untrusted and non-communicating servers, which store
the secret-shared database and execute users’ queries ( 4 ). The
non-communicating servers do not exchange data with each
other before/during/after the computation, and these servers only
exchange data with the user (or the DB owner). We use c servers
to provide privacy-preserving computations using SSS. Note
that a single non-trustworthy server cannot provide privacy-
preserving computations using secret-shares. Since we are using
MapReduce as our programming model, each server deploys
a master process that executes the computation by allocating
the map tasks and the reduce tasks. After the computation, the
servers provide secret-shared outputs to the user ( 5 ).
3) An (authenticated and authorized) user, who wishes to execute
queries on the secret-shared data at the servers. The users submit
the query to a secret-sharing-module at their ends and that
converts the query predicate to c secret-shared query predicates
( 2 ). These secret-shared query predicates are submitted to
(the master process at) c servers ( 3 ). Also, the user has an
interpolation module that receives the secret-shared outputs from
the servers ( 5 )and executes Lagrange interpolation [19] over
them to produce the final output ( 6 ).
It will be clear soon that the user performs the minimum work
in the case of count queries (§4.1), single tuple fetch queries
(§4.3.1), and primary-foreign keys-based join queries (§4.3.1).
However, the user performs some more work in case of fetching
multiple tuples (§4.2.2) and non-primary-foreign keys-based
join queries (§4.3.2). Nevertheless, the work performed by the
user is very less as compared to the servers, which will be
experimentally validated in §5.
Table 2 shows the notations used in this paper.
2.1 Data Model: Creation and Distribution of Secret-
Shares of a Relation
We first provide a simplified and insecure algorithm, and then, a
secure algorithm [18] for creating secret-shares based on SSS. We
explain the creation of secret-shares with the help of an example
of a relation, Employee; see Table 3.
Non-secret-shared encoded data. Assume that a database con-
tains only English words. Since the English alphabet consists of
26 letters, each letter can be represented by a unary vector with 26
bits. Hence, the letter ‘A’ is represented as (11, 02, 03, . . . , 026),
where the subscript represents the position of the letter; since
‘A’ is the first letter, the first value in the vector is one and
others are zero. Similarly, ‘B’ is (01, 12, 03, . . . , 026), ‘J’ is
(01, . . . , 09, 110, 011, . . . , 026), and so on. Now, if the database
EId FirstName LastName DateofBirth Salary Dept RID
E101 Adam Smith 12/07/1975 1000 Sale 1
E102 John Taylor 10/30/1985 2000 Design 2
E103 Eve Smith 05/07/1985 500 Sale 3
E104 John Williams 04/04/1990 5000 Sale 4
TABLE 3: A relation: Employee.
owner sends these vectors to a server, then the server can easily
deduce words.
The reason for using unary representation here is that it is
very easy to verify two identical letters. The expression output =∑r
i=0 ui × vi, compares two letters, where (u0, u1, . . . , ur) and
(v0, v1, . . . , vr) are two unary representations. It is clear that
whenever any two letters are identical, output is equal to one;
otherwise, output is equal to zero.
Secret-shared encoded data. When outsourcing a vector to the
servers, we use SSS and make secret-shares of every bit by select-
ing different polynomials of an identical degree; see Algorithm 1
in Appendix A.3 For example, the DB owner creates secret-shares
of each bit of the vector of ‘A’ ((11, 02, 03, . . . , 026)) by using 26
polynomials of an identical degree, since the length of the vector
is 26. Following that, the DB owner can create secret-shares of all
the other letters and distribute them to different servers.
Since we use SSS, a single server cannot infer a secret. More-
over, it is important to emphasize that we use different polynomials
for creating secret-shares of each occurrence of each letter; thereby
multiple occurrences of a word in a database have different secret-
shares. Therefore, a server is also unable to know the number of
occurrences of a word in the whole dataset. Following that, the
two occurrences of the word John in our example (see Table 3)
have two different secret-shares.
Secret-shares of numeral values. We follow a similar approach
for creating secret-shares of numeral values as used for alphabets.
In particular, the DB owner creates a unary vector of length 10
and places all the values zero except only one according to the
position of a number. For example, ‘1’ becomes (11, 02, . . . , 010),
‘0’ becomes (01, 02, . . . , 110), and so on. After that, the DB
owner uses SSS to create secret-shares of every bit of a vector
by selecting different polynomials of an identical degree and
sends them to multiple servers. Note that by following the same
procedure we can also create secret-shares of special letters or
symbols.
Data outsourcing. Let R be a relation of n tuples and m
attributes, denoted by A1, A2, . . . , Am. Let tij be a value at
the ith tuple and jth attribute. The DB owner adds one more
attribute, entitled RID , where the ith (1 ≤ i ≤ n) value of
the attribute RID contains the number i. The DB owner creates
c shares of each value tij of Ai (1 ≤ i ≤ m) and RID
attributes using the above-mentioned approach. This step results in
c relations: [R]i(A1, A2, . . . , Am,RID), where [R]i (1 ≤ i ≤ c)
denotes ith secret-shared relation. The secret-shared relation [R]i
is outsourced to the ith server. Table 3 shows an Employee relation
with one new additional attribute, namely RID .
Reducing the size of secret-shared data. The above-mentioned
approach for creating secret-shares of non-numerical values results
in a dataset of significantly large size and a large number of
servers, which depends on the maximum length of a value in
cleartext. For example, if there are two names, for example,
Jacqueline and Amy, then we may need 260 zeros or ones to
represent each of the names using unary representation. However,
3. Appendix A provides algorithms’ pseudocodes and their descriptions.
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we can reduce the size of unary representation by appropriately
mapping the words to a smaller domain. For example, we may
map the word Jacqueline to 1 and Amy to 2, and thereby need
only at most 10 zeros or ones to represent the newly obtained
values, which reduce the size of secret-shared data significantly.
Hashing can map large strings/text to smaller length strings;
however, hashing can result in a collision (two different values are
mapped to an identical hashed value). In case of collisions, results
received from servers can be erroneous. The user can overcome
errors in results for selection and join queries by filtering un-
desired tuples; however, in the case of count queries, there is no
way to know collisions and fix errors in query results that occurred
due to hash collisions. Nevertheless, the probability of collision
is extremely low. For a perfect hash function that generates k-
bit hashes, the probability of collision for n distinct elements is
Pcollision = n
2/2k+1. For example, for a 256-bit hash function,
the probability of collision in mapping all possible 32-bit integers
is 264/2256+1 = 1/2193, which is extremely low. Note that
cryptographic hash functions, for example, SHA2 (§8.6 of [41])
can provide a higher level of collision resistance, which is quite
comparable to a perfect hash function.
Note. The DB owner may use binary representation for represent-
ing secret-shares, due to its compact representation as compared
to unary representation. However, during string-matching opera-
tions over binary secret-shared data, polynomial degree increases
significantly and that requires more number of shares during
interpolation as compared to the number of shares required in the
case of unary secret-shared data. For example, consider a decimal
number, say n (= 300), having ld (= 3) digits in decimal, and
takes lb (= 9) digits in binary (100101100). Note that unary and
binary representation take 30 and 9 numbers to represent 300,
respectively. However, when the user wishes to know the result
of the string-matching operation in one communication round, we
need at least 2ld+1 and 2lb+1 servers for string-matching, when
using unary and binary representation, respectively.
2.2 Query Model
Let q be a query on a relation, say R(A1, A2, . . . , Am).
Let [R]1(A1, A2, . . . , Am,RID), [R]2(A1, A2, . . . , Am,RID),
. . ., [R]c(A1, A2, . . . , Am,RID) be secret-shared relations of the
relation R at c servers, one relation at each server. The query q is
transformed to c queries, say q1, q2, . . . , qc, that are transmitted
to servers such that the query qi is executed at the ith server. The
c servers execute the query and provide the secret-shared outputs.
The interpolation module at the user computes the final output by
executing a query, say qinterpolate , that interpolates the received
partial results.
Correctness. Consider an ideal execution of the query q, where the
DB owner executes the query and provides the answer to the user.
The query execution of the secret-shared data is correct when the
real execution of the query and the ideal execution of the query
provide an identical answer, i.e.,4
q(R) ≡ qinterpolate(q1([R]1), q2([R]2), . . . , qc([R]c))
2.3 Adversarial Settings
We consider an honest-but-curious adversary, which is widely con-
sidered in the standard security settings for the public cloud [42],
[43], [44]. The honest-but-curious adversary stores the database,
4. We do not provide any result verification approach in this paper, since we
are assuming an honest-but-curious adversary.
performs assigned computations correctly, and returns answers,
but tries to breach the privacy of data or (MapReduce) com-
putations, by analyzing data, computations, dataflow, or output-
sizes. However, such an adversary does not modify or delete
information/computation.
In our setting, the adversary cannot launch an attack against
the DB owner, who is trustworthy. Hence, the adversary cannot
access the secret-sharing algorithm at the DB owner. We follow the
restriction of the standard SSS that the adversary cannot collude
with all (or possibly the majority of) the servers, or the commu-
nication channels between the DB-owner/user and the majority of
the servers. This can be achieved by either encrypting the traffic
between user and servers, or by using anonymous routing [45].
Note that if the adversary can collude with the communication
channels between the majority of servers and user, then the secret-
sharing technique is not applicable. We assume that the adversary
knows the following publicly available information: (i) auxiliary
information about the relations, e.g., number of attributes, number
of tuples, organizations to which the relations belong; (ii) the size
of outputs transferred from mappers to reducers and from the
server to the user; and (iii) any background knowledge. Having
above-mentioned information, the adversarial goal is to learn the
database/query and the tuple satisfying the query.
Aside. The overhead in considering Byzantine faults is high, so
systems will use other means to detect and replace Byzantine
participants (which is orthogonal to our scope). It should also
be noted that standard techniques based on Berlekamp-Welch
algorithm [46], where additional secret-shares are used to encode
the data can be directly applied here, enabling us to cope with a
malicious adversary. For instance, the method given in [47] may
be used. However, any verification algorithm is error prone, as
it is based on some redundancy used for error-detection/error-
correction. Verifiability of the received shares may be required,
since noise in the transmission channel can corrupt some bits. In
this case, a suitable cryptographic hash function can be applied
to the secret-shared answers and the corresponding hash values
can be published on a bulletin board by each server. On receiving
the secret-shared answers from the servers, the user can compute
the hash value on the received shares and compare it against
the corresponding hash value published on the bulletin board. If
they match, then the received shares are correct in the sense that
transmitted shares by the servers are accurately received at the
user. Otherwise, the user discards the received shares and may
request the server to resend the secret-shared answers.
2.4 Security Goals and Analysis
The security goals under the above-mentioned system and adver-
sarial settings are twofold:
(i) Data privacy requires that the stored input data, intermediate
data during computations, and output data are not revealed to the
servers, and the secret value can only be reconstructed by the
DB owner or an authorized user. In addition, the two or more
occurrences of a value in the relation must be different at the
servers to prevent frequency-count analysis, while data is at the
rest. Data privacy also must prevent any statistical inference on
the data after the query execution, so that the adversary cannot
find how many numbers of tuples satisfy a query.
(ii) Query privacy requires that the user query must be hidden
from the servers, as well as, the DB owner. Additionally, the
servers cannot distinguish two or more queries of an identical
type based on the output-sizes. Note that all the count queries
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Computation on
Operations Server 1 Server 2 Server 3 Server 4 Server 5
Multiplication 2× 3 = 6 3× 5 = 15 4× 7 = 28 5× 9 = 45 6× 11 = 66
Multiplication 5× 4 = 20 10× 8 = 80 15× 12 = 180 20× 16 = 320 25× 20 = 500
Add (N1 value) 26 95 208 365 566
Multiplication 2× 3 = 6 4× 6 = 24 6× 9 = 54 8× 12 = 96 10× 15 = 150
Multiplication 9× 8 = 72 17× 15 = 255 25× 22 = 550 33× 29 = 957 41× 36 = 1626
Add (N2 value) 78 279 604 1053 1366
Multiplication (N3 value) 2028 26505 125632 384345 920316
TABLE 4: Multiplication of shares and addition of final shares by the servers.
are of the same type based on output-sizes, since they return an
identical number of bits as compared to selection or join queries.
Following that the servers cannot distinguish two or more selection
or join queries based on the output-size. In addition, query privacy
requires that all the filtering operations (e.g., selection) are pushed
down before the join operation while not revealing selection
predicates and qualified tuples. Thus, in short, to achieve the
query privacy, we need to prevent access-patterns and output-
size attacks. Note that since we are using MapReduce, we need
to prevent access-patterns and output-size attacks at the map and
reduce phases, as well.
3 AN EXAMPLE OF STRING-MATCHING USING AC-
CUMULATING AUTOMATA
Before going into details of algorithms, we provide an example to
understand the working of string-matching algorithm over secret-
shares, since our algorithms for count, selection (or tuple fetch),
and join queries are based on string-matching over secret-shares,
which is executed using accumulating automata (AA) [18].
Notations. Let s be a string in cleartext, and sj be the jth alphabet
of the string. Let [s]i be the ith share of the string. Let Len(s) be
the length of the cleartext string s, and Len([s]) be the length of
the secret-shared string [s]. Let p be a cleartext query predicate,
and [p]i be the ith secret-shared query predicate.
The string-matching algorithm consists of the following steps:
DB owner: Secret-shared database outsourcing. Assume that there
are only two alphabets: J and O; thus, we can represent J as 〈1, 0〉
and O as 〈0, 1〉. If the DB owner outsources a word ‘JO’ by
creating a vector 〈1, 0, 0, 1〉, then the adversary will know the
string. Hence, the DB owner creates secret-shares of each value
of the vector using polynomials of an identical degree, as shown
in Table 5. Note that by using this type of unary representation, in
this example, the length of secret-shared string Len([s]) will twice
the length of the original string. Thus, in this example, the jth
alphabet of the cleartext string s is mapped to two secret-shared
numbers. Further, note that we create five shares. It will be clear
soon that to execute string-matching algorithm over a cleartext
string, s, of length, Len(s), we need at least 2Len(s) + 1 shares.
Vector
values
Polynomials First
shares
Second
shares
Third
shares
Fourth
shares
Fifth
shares
1 1 + x 2 3 4 5 6
0 0 + 5x 5 10 15 20 25
0 0 + 2x 2 4 6 8 10
1 1 + 8x 9 17 25 33 41
TABLE 5: Secret-shares of a vector 〈1, 0, 0, 1〉, created by the DB
owner.
User: Secret-shared query generation. A user submits its query to
the secret-sharing module that creates unary vectors for each letter
of the query predicate, and then, creates secret-shares of each value
of the unary vectors using any polynomial of the same degree as
used by the DB owner,5 before sending them to the servers. For
example, if the user wants to search for JO, then the secret-sharing
module creates a unary vector as 〈1, 0, 0, 1〉, creates secret-shares
of this vector (see Table 6), and sends to servers.
Vector
values
Polynomials First
shares
Second
shares
Third
shares
Fourth
shares
Fifth
shares
1 1 + 2x 3 5 7 9 11
0 0 + 4x 4 8 12 16 20
0 0 + 3x 3 6 9 12 15
1 1 + 7x 8 15 22 29 36
TABLE 6: Secret-shares of a vector 〈1, 0, 0, 1〉, created by the
user.
Servers: String-matching operation. Each server holds: (i) a
secret-shared string [s] (for example, ‘JO’ of secret-shared form),
and (ii) the secret-shared searching predicate [p] (for example,
‘JO’ of secret-shared form). For executing the string-matching
operation, the server creates an automaton with Len(s)+1 nodes,
of which the first Len(s) nodes perform bit-wise multiplication
between string and predicate vectors, and the last node keeps the
final result by multiplying outputs of all the first Len(s)+1 nodes.
Table 7 shows all the steps taken by the automaton. Further, we
explain the steps given in Table 7 to show how servers search a
pattern ‘JO’ over the string ‘JO’; see Table 4.
STEP 1: N1 = [s]1  [p]1
STEP 2: N2 = [s]2  [p]2
...
STEP Len(s): NLen(s) = [s]Len(s)  [p]Len(s)
STEP Len(s) + 1: NLen(s)+1 = N1 ×N2 × . . .×NLen(s)
Notations: : bit-wise multiplication and addition of all values in a vector.
TABLE 7: The accumulating automation steps executed by the
server for performing string-matching operation.
User: Result reconstruction. Once the user receives the re-
sults from all the servers, the interpolation module performs
Lagrange interpolation to obtain the final answer, as follows:
(x−2)(x−3)(x−4)(x−5)
(1−2)(1−3)(1−4)(1−5) × 2028 + (x−1)(x−3)(x−4)(x−5)(2−1)(2−3)(2−4)(2−5) × 26505+
(x−1)(x−2)(x−4)(x−5)
(3−1)(3−2)(3−4)(3−5) × 125632 + (x−1)(x−2)(x−3)(x−5)(4−1)(4−2)(4−3)(4−5) × 384345+
(x−1)(x−2)(x−3)(x−4)
(5−1)(5−2)(5−3)(5−4) × 920316 = 1
Now, note that the final answer is 1, which shows that the secret-
shared string at the server matches the user query.
4 PRIVACY-PRESERVING QUERY PROCESSING ON
SECRET-SHARES USING MAPREDUCE
This section presents privacy-preserving algorithms for perform-
ing three fundamental operations, i.e., count, selection, and join
queries, on secret-shared relations.
4.1 Count Query
This section presents an oblivious counting algorithm that finds
the number of occurrences of a query keyword/pattern, p, in an
5. We do not need to create an identical share of a searching pattern that is
identical to the outsourced data. Note that the secure cryptographic techniques
(e.g., searchable encryption [31], oblivious keyword search [48], or function-
secret-sharing [33]) do not create a searching pattern that is identical to the
outsourced data.
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attribute, Ai, of a relation, R. Note that count query algorithm
for MapReduce is an extension of string-matching algorithm AA.
Algorithm 2 in Appendix A presents pseudocode of counting
algorithm. The algorithm proceeds as follows:
User: secret-shared query generation. The user sends the count
query having a predicate p to the secret-sharing module. The
secret-sharing module transforms the query predicate p into c
secret-shared predicates, denoted by [p]j (where 1 ≤ j ≤ c),
as suggested in §2.1. The secret-shared count query predicates are
sent to c servers.
Servers: count query execution. Now, a server holds the following:
(i) a relation of secret-shared form, (ii) the secret-shared counting
predicate [p], and (iii) the code of mappers. A mapper at each
server, say k ∈ [1, c], performs the string-matching algorithm (as
explained in §3) that compares each value [vj ]k (1 ≤ j ≤ n) of
the attribute Ai of the relation [R]k with the query predicate [p]k.
If the value [vj ]k and the predicate [p]k match, it will result in one
of secret-share form; otherwise, the result will be zero of secret-
share form. While executing the string-matching operation on the
next value [vj+1]k, the output of the previous matching operation
is added, leading to provide the final output after executing the
string-matching operation on all values of the attribute Ai. Since
the sum of the values (one or zero) is of secret-shared form, the
servers cannot learn the exact answer, and the mapper sends the
final value to the user. The count query execution steps are given
in Table 8. Note that all the steps are identical to the steps given
in Table 7, except the last step for counting the occurrences.
STEP 1r: Nr1 = [vr]1  [p]1
STEP 2r: Nr2 = [vr]2  [p]2
...
STEP Len(vr )r: NrLen(vr ) = [vr]Len(vr )  [p]Len(vr )
STEP (Len(vr ) + 1)r: count = count + Nr1 ×Nr2 × . . .×NrLen(vr )
Notations. 1 ≤ r ≤ n: the number of the tuples in the relation. : bit-wise
multiplication and addition of all values in a vector.
TABLE 8: The accumulating automation steps executed by the
server for count query.
User: result reconstruction. The user performs an interpolation
operation on the outputs obtained from servers, and it will produce
the final answer to the count query.
Example. Suppose the count query on the employee relation (see
Table 3) is: SELECT COUNT(*) FROM Employee WHERE
FirstName = ‘John’. Table 9 shows how do the servers
execute this query. Note that for explanation purpose, we show
cleartext values; however, servers execute operations on secret-
shares.
FirstName String-matching resultant Count value
Adam 0 0
John 1 1
Eve 0 0
John 1 2
TABLE 9: Count query execution example, when counting
FirstName = ‘John’.
Remark: Use of multiple mappers and a reducer. In MapRe-
duce, one can use many mappers to process the query. Thus, each
mapper processes a different split of the relation and produces
output of the form of a 〈key , value〉 pair, where the key is an
identity of an input split on which the operation was performed,
and the corresponding value is the final summation of secret-
shared values obtained as the string-matching resultant on the
attribute Ai. Here, a single reducer at a server processes all
〈key , value〉 pairs and adds value of each split to provide a single
secret-shared value to the user.
Aside. If a user searches John in a database containing names
like ‘John’ and ‘Johnson,’ then our algorithm will show two
occurrences of John. However, this is a problem associated
with string-matching. In order to search a predicate precisely,
we may use the terminating symbol for indicating the end of the
predicate. In the above example, we can use “John ”, which is
the searching predicate ending with a whitespace, to obtain the
correct answer.
4.2 Selection Queries
This section presents oblivious algorithms for selection queries.
The proposed algorithms first execute count query Algorithm 2
for finding the number of tuples containing a selection predicate,
say p, and then, after obtaining addresses of tuples6 containing
p, fetches such tuples. Specifically, we provide 2-phased selection
query algorithms, where:
PHASE 0: Count the occurrence of p.
PHASE 1: Finding addresses of tuples containing p.
PHASE 2: Fetching all the tuples containing p.
We classify the selection query based on the number of tuples
with a value, as follows:
One value holds only one tuple. For example, the Salary
attribute contains four values, and each value appears in one tuple;
see Table 3. In this case, there is no need to know the address of the
tuple containing p, i.e., implementing PHASE 1. §4.2.1 presents an
algorithm for retrieving tuples in the case of one value with one
tuple.
Multiple values hold multiple tuples. For example, the
FirstName attribute contains four values, and two employees
have the same first name as John; see Table 3. In this case, we
need to know the address of the tuple containing p (PHASE 1)
before retrieving the desired tuples. §4.2.2 presents two algorithms
for retrieving tuples when a value can appear in multiple tuples.
4.2.1 One Value — One Tuple
In the case of one tuple per value, Algorithm 3 (pseudocode
is given in Appendix A) fetches the entire tuple in a privacy-
preserving manner without revealing the selection predicate p and
the tuple satisfying p, as follows:
User: secret-shared query generation. Consider the follow-
ing query: SELECT * FROM R WHERE Aj = p. The secret-
sharing module at the user creates c secret-shares of p and sends
them to c servers, as did in count query 4.1.
Servers: selection query execution. The server executes a map
function that matches the secret-shared predicate [p] with each
secret-shared value [vi] (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) of the attribute Aj .
Consequently, the map function results in either 0 or 1 of secret-
shared form. If [p] matches [vi] value of the attribute Aj , then the
result is 1. After that, the map function multiplies the resultant
(0 or 1) by all the other attribute values of the ith tuple. Thus,
the map function creates a (virtual) relation of n tuples and m
attributes, where all the tuples contain 0 across all the attributes
except the tuple that contains p in the attribute Aj . When the map
function finishes on all the n tuples, it adds all the secret-shares of
each attribute, as: S1||S2|| . . . ||Sm, and sends to the user, where
Sj is the sum of all the secret-shares value of the jth (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
attribute. (If there are multiple mappers are executed on different
splits, then a single reducer adds all the values of the mappers,
which provides the final answer to the selection query.)
6. The address of a tuple indicates an index of the tuple, e.g., the fifth tuple.
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User: result reconstruction. At the user-side, the interpolation
module, on receiving shares from servers, performs Lagrange
interpolation that provides the desired tuple containing p in the
attribute Aj .
4.2.2 Multiple Values with Multiple Tuples
When multiple tuples contain a selection predicate, say p, the
user cannot fetch all those tuples obliviously without knowing
their addresses. Therefore, we first need to design an algorithm
to obliviously obtain the addresses of all the tuples containing the
predicate p, and then, obliviously fetch the tuples. Throughout this
section, we consider that ` tuples contain p. This section provides
two search algorithms that have 2-phases, as:
PHASE 0: Count the occurrence of p.
PHASE 1: Finding the addresses of the desired ` tuples.
PHASE 2: Fetching all the ` tuples (according to their addresses).
The algorithms differ only in PHASE 1 to know the addresses
of the desired tuples, as follows: The first algorithm, called
one-round algorithm requires only one-round of communication
between the user and the server, while the second algorithm, called
tree-based algorithm requires multiple rounds of communication,
but has lower communication cost. Before going into details of
algorithms, we first explore a tradeoff.
Tradeoff. When fetching multiple tuples containing p, there is a
tradeoff between the number of communication rounds and the
computational cost at the user, and this tradeoff will be clear
after the description of one-round and tree-based algorithms. In
particular, the user interpolates n values to know the addresses of
all the tuples containing p in one-round algorithm. On the other
hand, obtaining the addresses of tuples containing p in multiple
rounds requires executing a count query multiple times by the
servers, while the user performs an interpolation (on less than n
values) to know the answer of count queries.
One-round algorithm. The one-round algorithm requires only
one communication round between the user and the server for
each of the two phases of the selection query algorithm. Assume
that a selection query is: SELECT * FROM R WHERE Aj = p.
User: secret-shared query generation. This step is identical to the
step carried previously in case of one tuple per value (§4.2.1).
Servers: finding addresses. In PHASE 1, the server executes a
map function that performs the string-matching algorithm on each
secret-share value of the attribute Aj , (as we did to count the
occurrences of a predicate in §4.1). However, now, the mapper
does not accumulate string-matching results, and hence, sends n
string-matching resultant values corresponding to each tuple to the
user.
User: result reconstruction and a vector creation for fetching
tuples. The interpolation module at the user executes Lagrange
interpolation on each value, resulting in a vector of length n, where
the ith entity has either 0 or 1 depending on the occurrence of p
in the ith tuple of the attribute Aj of the relation R. Thus, the
user knows addresses (RID) of all the desired tuples in a single
round, but the user interpolates n secret-shared values.7 Knowing
the addresses of the desired tuples results in some information-
leakage, which will be discussed in §6.5.
Suppose that ` tuples contain the predicate p in the attribute
Aj . Now, the secret-sharing module at the user creates a vector,
7. Experiments (§5) show that interpolating n values does not incur signifi-
cant workload at the user.
say vec, of length `. Note that the secret-sharing module can create
a vector of larger length too to hide the number of tuples satisfying
the predicate p; we will discuss leakage issue in detail in §6.2.2.
The vector vec contains all the row-ids, RID ,8 of tuples that
contain the predicate p in the attribute Aj . The secret-sharing
module creates secret-shares of each value of the vector vec, by
following the approach as suggested in §2.1, and sends them to
the servers.
Servers. In PHASE 2, the map function at servers executes the
same operation on each value of the attribute RID and each value
of the received secret-shared vector, as the map function executed
in the case of one tuple per value. Finally, the map function
provides ` tuples. Particularly, the map function executes string-
matching operation between ith (1 ≤ i ≤ n) value of the attribute
RID and jth (1 ≤ j ≤ `) value of the secret-shared vector, which
results in a value oij (either 0 or 1 of secret-shared form). The
string-matching resultant oij is multiplied by all the remaining
attribute values of the ith tuple. Finally, a sum operation is carried
out on each attribute value. Note that the secret-shared vector
contains secret-shared row-ids that each of them will surely match
with only one of the n values of the attribute RID ; hence, after
multiplying secret-shared string-matching resultants and adding
all the values of each attribute, the mapper will produce secret-
shared ` desired tuples, without knowing which tuples have been
satisfied with the selection query.
User: result reconstruction. The interpolation module executes
Lagrange interpolation over ` secret-shared tuples and provides
the final answer to the user.
Example. Suppose the selection query is: SELECT EId,
FirstName, LastName, DateofBirth, Salary
FROM Employee WHERE FirstName = ‘John’. Here,
we show how do the servers and user execute this query. Note
that for explanation purpose, we use cleartext values; however,
servers execute operations on secret-shares. In this example, the
server, first, performs string-matching operations on FirstName
attribute and sends a vector having 〈0, 1, 0, 1〉 to the user.
Table 10 shows string-matching operation results.
FirstName String-matching resultant
Adam 0
John 1
Eve 0
John 1
TABLE 10: String-matching results, when searching FirstName
= ‘John’.
Based on the received vector 〈0, 1, 0, 1〉, the user knows that
it needs to fetch second and fourth tuples. Thus, the secret-sharing
module at the user creates a vector, vec = 〈2, 4〉, creates secret-
shares of the vector vec, and sends them to the server. The
server executes string-matching operations on each value of RID
attribute of the relation and secret-shared vector, multiplies the
resultant to the tuple values, and adds all the values of each
attribute. For example, Table 11 shows the execution at the server
for only row-id 2 in cleartext.
Tree-based algorithm. In order to decrease the computational
load at the user, unlike one-round algorithm, for knowing the de-
sired tuple addresses, we propose a tree-based search (Algorithm 4
in Appendix A) that finds the addresses of the desired ` number of
tuples in multiple rounds, and then, fetches all the desired ` tuples
(by following the same method like one-round algorithm).
8. We will use the words ‘row-id’ and ‘tuple-id’ interchangeably.
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RID SMR EId FirstName LastName DateofBirth Salary
1 0 0×(E101) 0×(Adam) 0×(Smith) 0×(12/07/1975) 0×(1000)
2 1 1×(E102) 1×(John) 1×(Taylor) 1×(10/30/1985) 1×(2000)
3 0 0×(E103) 0×(Eve) 0×(Smith) 0×(05/07/1985) 0×(500)
4 0 0×(E104) 0×(John) 0×(Williams) 0×(04/04/1990) 0×(5000)
2 E102 John Taylor 10/30/1985 2000
TABLE 11: Tuple retrieval process, shown only for the second
tuple. SMR: string-matching resultant.
Taking inspiration form Algorithm 3 for one tuple per value
(given in §4.2.1), we can also obtain the row-id in an oblivious
manner, while a single tuple contains the selection predicate p.
Thus, for finding addresses of ` tuples containing p, the user
requests the servers to partition the whole relation into certain
blocks (≥ `, depending on the privacy requirements) such that
each block belongs to one of the following cases:
1) A block contains no occurrence of p, and hence, no fetch
operation is needed.
2) A block contains one/multiple tuples but only a single tuple
contains p.
3) A block contains h tuples, and all the h tuples contain p.
4) A block contains multiple tuples but fewer tuples contain p.
Finding addresses. We follow an idea of partitioning the
database and counting the occurrences of p in the blocks, until
each block satisfies one of the above-mentioned cases. Specifi-
cally, the user initiates a sequence of Query & Answer (Q&A)
rounds. In the first Q&A round, the user asks the servers to count
the occurrences of p in the whole database (or in an assigned
input split to a mapper) and then partitions the database into
at least ` blocks, since we assumed that ` tuples contain p. In
the second Q&A round, the user again asks the servers to count
the occurrences of p in each block and focuses on the blocks
satisfying Case 4 (due to performance; we will discuss leakages vs
performance involved in this method in §6.2.2). There is no need
to consider the blocks satisfying Case 2 or 3, since the user can
apply Algorithm 3 (one tuple per value) in both cases. However,
if the multiple tuples of a block in the second round contain p,
i.e., Case 4, the user again asks the servers to partition such a
block until it satisfies either Case 1, 2 or 3. After that, the user can
obtain the addresses of the related tuples using the method similar
to Algorithm 3. Note that in this case, the user does not need to
interpolate n values corresponding to each row.
Fetching tuples. After knowing the row-ids, the user applies
the approach described in the one-round algorithm for fetching
multiple tuples.
Tuple 1
Tuple 2
Tuple 3
Tuple 4
Tuple 5
Tuple 6
Tuple 7
Tuple 8
Tuple 9
# Occurrences  = 2
# Occurrences = 2
Tuple 1
Tuple 2
Tuple 3
Q&A Round 1 Q&A Round 2
Tuple 4
Tuple 5
Database
Tuple 1
Tuple 2
Tuple 3
Tuple 4
Tuple 5
Tuple 6
Tuple 7
Tuple 8
Tuple 9
# Occurrence = 0
# Occurrences = 2
# Occurrence = 0
Tuple 1
Tuple 2
Tuple 3
# Occurrence = 1
# Occurrence = 1
Q&A Round 3
Fig. 2: Example of Q&A rounds.
Example. Figure 2 provides an example to illustrate the tree-based
approach. Assume that an input split consists of 9 tuples, and the
number of occurrences of p is two. When the user knows the
number of occurrences, the user starts Q&A rounds. In each Q&A
round, a mapper partitions specific parts of the input split into
two blocks, performs counting operation in each block, and sends
results (which are occurrences of p in each block) of the form of
secret-shares, back to the user.
In this example, the user initiates the first Q&A round, and a
mapper divides the input split into two blocks. In each block, it
counts the occurrences of p and sends the results to the user. The
interpolation module at the user executes Lagrange interpolation
and provides that the first and second blocks contain two and zero
tuples having p, respectively. In the second Q&A round, the user
requests to the servers to partition the first block into two blocks.
The mapper performs an identical operation as it does in the first
Q&A round, and after three Q&A rounds, the user knows the
addresses of all the tuples containing p.
4.3 Join Queries
Consider two relations X(A,B) and Y (B,C), where B is the
joining attribute. A trivial solution for an oblivious join is, as
follows: (i) fetch all the secret-shared values of the joining attribute
from servers and interpolate them, (ii) find tuples of both relations
that have an identical joining value and fetch all those tuples,
(iii) interpolate all the secret-shared tuples, and (iv) perform a
MapReduce job for joining the tuples at the user. However, note
that in this solution, the user performs most of the computation.
To decrease the computational load at the user, the following
sections present oblivious join algorithms for primary to foreign
key (PK/FK) join and oblivious non-PK/FK equijoin at the servers.
4.3.1 PK/FK-based Oblivious Join
Consider two relations: a parent relation X(A,B) having the
attribute B as a primary key and nx tuples, and a child relation
Y (B,C) of ny tuples. We use string-matching operations (a
variant of one tuple per value; Algorithm 3) on secret-shares for
performing PK/FK join on X(A,B) and Y (B,C) relations based
on the B attribute. The following steps are executed:
1. At the server:
a. A mapper reads ith tuple 〈∗, bi〉 of the relation X and
provides ny pairs of 〈key , value〉, where the key is an
identity from 1 to ny and the value is the ith secret-shared
tuple 〈∗, bi〉. A “∗” denotes any value.
b. A mapper reads jth tuple 〈bj , ∗〉 of the relation Y and
provides one pair of 〈key , value〉, where the key is the tuple
id and the value is jth secret-shared tuple 〈bj , ∗〉.
c. All the tuples of the relation X(A,B) and the ith tuple of
the relation Y (B,C) are assigned to the ith reducer. The
reducer performs string-matching operations on the B at-
tribute, resulting in 0 or 1 of secret-shared form. Specifically,
the reducer matches bi ∈ Y with each bj ∈ X , and the
resultant of the string-matching operation (of bi and bj) is
multiplied by the tuple 〈∗, bj〉 of the relation X(A,B). After
performing the string-matching operation on all the B values
of the X(A,B) relation, the reducer adds all the secret-
shares of the A and B attributes of the relation X . This will
result in a tuple, say 〈∗′, b′〉. The C value of the tuple 〈b, ∗〉
of the relation Y is appended to 〈∗′, b′〉, and it results in the
final joined tuple 〈∗′, b′, ∗〉.
2. The user fetches all the outputs of reducers from the servers and
interpolates them to obtains the outputs of the join.
Example. Table 12 shows two relations X and Y , and their
joined outputs. For explanation purpose, we show cleartext values.
The mapper reads the tuple 〈a1, b1〉 and provides 〈1, [a1, b1]〉,
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A B
a1 b1
a2 b2
a3 b3
B C
b1 c1
b2 c2
b2 c3
b2 c4
A B C
a1 b1 c1
a2 b2 c2
a2 b2 c3
a2 b2 c4
TABLE 12: Two relations X(A,B) and Y (B,C), and their
joined outputs.
〈2, [a1, b1]〉, 〈3, [a1, b1]〉, and 〈4, [a1, b1]〉. A similar operation is
also carried out on the tuples 〈a2, b2〉 and 〈a3, b3〉. Mappers read
the tuples 〈b1, c1〉, 〈b2, c2〉, 〈b2, c3〉, and 〈b2, c4〉 and provide
〈1, [b1, c1]〉, 〈2, [b2, c2]〉, 〈3, [b2, c3]〉, and 〈4, [b2, c4]〉, respec-
tively.
A reducer corresponding to key 1 matches b1 of X with b1 of
Y that results in 1, b2 of X with b1 of Y that results in 0, and b3
of X with b1 of Y that results in 0. Remember 0 and 1 are of the
form of secret-shares. Now, the reducer multiplies the three values
(1,0,0) of the form of secret-shares by the tuples 〈a1, b1〉, 〈a2, b2〉,
and 〈a3, b3〉, respectively. After that, the reducer adds all the A-
values and the B-values. Note that we will obtain now only the
desired tuple, i.e., 〈a1, b1〉. The reducer appends theC value of the
tuple 〈b1, c1〉 to the tuple 〈a1, b1〉. The same operation is carried
out by other reducers. When the user performs the interpolation
on the outputs, only the desired joined output tuples are obtained.
Aside. We assume that all the A, B, and C values of the relations
do not contain zero.
4.3.2 Non-PK/FK-based oblivious equijoin
This section presents an oblivious non-PK/FK equijoin algorithm.
Consider two relations X(A,B) and Y (B,C) having n tuples
in each and B as a joining attribute that can have multiple
occurrences of a value in both relations.
Note that PK/FK-based join approach, §4.3.1, will not work
here. The reason is as follows: when the B value of a tuple,
say 〈a1, b1〉, of the relation X is compared with all tuples of
Y that contains multiple tuples with the value b1, say 〈b1, c1〉,
〈b1, c2〉 . . ., it results in multiple ones that will produce all the
desired tuples of the relation Y containing b1. Here, the sum of
all the values of an attribute cannot distinguish two or multiple
occurrences of the b1 value, and hence, the result will be incorrect.
In the proposed oblivious non-PK/FK join approach, the user
performs a little bit more computation, unlike PK/FK join. In
particular, the user interpolates all secret-shared B-values of both
relations, finds common B values of both relations, and then,
requests the servers to execute the join operation. Note that here
the user will also know which B-values of the relations do not
join and the addresses of the joining tuples in both relations. We
will discuss information-leakage and their prevention in §6.5.
In order to perform oblivious non-PK/FK join, we need c more
non-communicating servers.9 Here, we call a set of the first c
servers as the first layer, and a set of the remaining c servers as
the second layer. Note that the servers within a layer are non-
communicating; however, the ith server of the first layer can
communicate with only the ith server of the second layer. We
assume that the first layer holds the relations, and the second layer
provides outputs to an equijoin; see Figure 3.
Approach. The approach consists of the following three steps,
where the second step that performs an equijoin is executed at
the servers:
9. The use of c additional servers makes the explanation easier. However, at
the end of the algorithm, we show how to overcome these additional c servers.
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Fig. 3: The two layers of the servers for an oblivious equijoin. The
first layer executes selection queries using the one-round algorithm
and the second layer executes an equijoin.
1. The user fetches all the secret-shared B-values of the relations
X and Y and performs an interpolation. Consequently, the user
knows which B-values are identical in both relations and which
tuples contain identical joining values.
2. For each B-value (say, bi) that is in both the relations:
a. The user executes PHASE 2 of the one-round algorithm (given
in §4.2.2) for the value bi on the first layer servers that
obliviously send all the tuples containing bi of the relations
X and Y to the second layer servers. Figure 3 illustrates the
algorithm’s execution. (Note that after interpolating B-values
of both the relations, the user also knows the RID values of
common B-values. Hence, here is no need to execute PHASE
1 of the one-round algorithm.)
b. On receiving tuples containing the joining value bi from the
first layer, the second layer servers create two new relations,
say X ′(A,B) and Y ′(B,C), corresponding to the tuples of
the relations X and Y , respectively. Then, the second layer
servers execute an oblivious equijoin MapReduce job on X ′
and Y ′, and provide the output of an equijoin.
In particular, a mapper reads a tuple, say 〈∗, bi〉, of the
relation X ′ and produces k pairs of 〈key , value〉, where k
is the number of tuples in the relation Y ′, the key is 1 to k,
and the value is the secret-shared tuple 〈∗, bi〉. In addition,
a mapper reads a tuple, say 〈bi, ∗〉, of the relation Y ′ and
produces one pair of 〈key , value〉, where the key is the
tuple id, and the value is the secret-shared tuple 〈bi, ∗〉. A
reducer i is assigned all the tuples of the X ′(A,B) relation
and the ith tuple of the Y ′(B,C) relation. The reducer
concatenates each tuple of the X ′(A,B) relation with the
ith tuple of the Y ′(B,C). Since the two new relations,
X ′(A,B) and Y ′(B,C), have only one identical B-value,
the concatenation provides the correct answer.
3. The user fetches the output tuples from the second layer servers
and performs the interpolation.
Note. We used two layers of servers to better explain the approach.
However, one can avoid the second layer servers trivially by
placing the work of the second layer servers at the first layer
servers. Thus, after executing Step 2a (i.e., fetching tuples having
common bi-values in both relations), the c servers can execute the
join operations (Step 2b).
4.4 Range Query
A range query finds, for example, all the employees whose
salaries are between $1000 and $2000. We propose an approach
for performing privacy-preserving range queries based on 2’s
complement subtraction. A number, say x, belongs in a range,
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say [a, b], if sign(x − a) = 0 and sign(x − b) = 0, where
sign(x − a) and sign(b − x) denote the sign bits of x − a and
x− b, respectively, after 2’s complement-based subtraction.
Recall that in §2.1, we proposed an approach for creating
secret-shares of a number, say x, using a unary representation
that provides a vector, where all the values are 0 except only
1 according to the position of the number. The approach works
well to count the occurrences of x and fetch all the tuples having
x. However, on unary vectors, we cannot perform a subtraction
operation using 2’s complement. Hence, to execute range queries,
we present a number using a binary-representation, which results
in a vector of length, say l. After that, we use SSS to make
secret-shares of every bit in the vector by selecting l different
polynomials of an identical degree for each bit position.
Approach. The idea of finding whether a number, x, belongs
to the range, [a, b], is based on 2’s complement subtraction.
In [47], the authors provided an algorithm for subtracting secret-
shares using 2’s complement. However, we will provide a simple
2’s complement-based subtraction algorithm for secret-shares. A
mapper checks the sign bits after subtraction for deciding the
number whether it is in the range or not, as follows:
If x ∈ [a, b], op1 = sign(x− a) = 0, op2 = sign(b− x) = 0
If x < a, op1 = sign(x− a) = 1, op2 = sign(b− x) = 0
If x > b, op1 = sign(x− a) = 0, op2 = sign(b− x) = 1
(1)
The mappers execute the above equation on each value of the
desired attribute and add op1 and op2.
Range-based count query. For a range-based count query (pseu-
docode is given Algorithm 5 in Appendix A), after executing the
above Equation 1 and adding op1 and op2, the mapper has n
values, either 0 or 1 of secret-shared form, where n is the number
of tuples in a relation. Finally, the mapper adds all the n values
and provides the result to the answer.
On receiving the secret-shared answer, the user interpolates
them. The answer shows how many tuples have not satisfied the
range query, and subtracting the answer from n provides the final
answer to the range-based count query. (Recall that n is assumed
to be a publicly known §2.3.)
Range-based selection query. The servers execute equation (1)
and add op1 and op2, which results in n values, either 0 or 1 of
secret-shared form, where n is the number of tuples in a relation.
Finally, the server provides n values to the user.
The user interpolates all the received n values from servers. If
the number x in the ith tuples belongs in the range [a, b], then the
ith position in the array is zero. Otherwise, the ith position in the
array is one. Finally, the user fetches all the tuples having value
0 in the array using the one-round algorithm for fetching multiple
tuples; see §4.2.2.
Note. After obtaining secret-shares of sign bits of op1 = x − a
and op1 = b− x, instead of adding op1 and op2, the mapper can
also perform the following:
1− (sign(x− a) + sign(b− x)). (2)
According to Equation 1, if x ∈ [a, b], the result of Equation 2 is
secret-share of 1; otherwise, the result is secret-share of 0. Also,
note that after doing this operation, when mappers will send an
answer to the count query, after interpolation at the user, it will
produce the correct answer to the count query, unlike the above-
mentioned method, where the user subtracts from n. Similarly,
in the case of selection queries, the user creates a vector of 1 or
0 to find the qualified tuples, however, the user will fetch tuples
according to the position of 1 in the vector.
2’s complement-based secret-shares subtraction. Algorithm 6
(pseudocode is given in Appendix A) provides a way to perform
2’s complement-based subtraction on secret-shares. We follow the
definition of 2’s complement subtraction to convert B − A into
B + A¯ + 1, where A¯ + 1 is 2’s complement representation of
−A. We start at the least significant bit (LSB), invert a0, calculate
a¯0 + b0 + 1 and its carry bit (lines 1- 3 of Algorithm 6). Then,
we go through the rest of the bits, calculate the carry and the
result for each bit (line 4 of Algorithm 6). After finishing all the
computations, the most significant bit (MSB) or the sign bit is
returned (line 5 of Algorithm 6). This method is similar to the
method presented in [47], but simpler, as we only need the sign
bit of the result.
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
This section shows the experimental results of our proposed
algorithms. We used servers having 64GB RAM, 3.0GHz Intel
Xeon CPU with 36 cores in AWS EMR clusters, while a 16GB
RAM machine was used as the DB owner, as well as, a user that
communicates with AWS servers.
Secret-share (SS) dataset generation. We used three tables
of TPC-H benchmark, namely Nation with columns Nation-
Key (NK), Name (NE), and RegionKey (RK), Customer with
columns CustKey (CK), CustName (CN), NationKey (NK), and
MarketSegment (MS), and Supplier with columns SuppKey
(SK), SuppName (SN), and NationKey (NK). We placed 1M
and 9M rows in Customer table and 70K and 670K rows in
Supplier table, while Nation table has 25 rows.
SS-Customer table generation. We explain the method followed
to generate SS data for 1M Customer rows. A similar method
was used to generate SS data for 9M rows. The four columns of
Customer table contain numbers: CK: 1 to 1,000,000 (9,000,000
in 9M dataset), CN: 1 to 1,000,000 (9,000,000 in 9M dataset),
NK: 1 to 25, and MS: 1 to 5. The following steps are required to
generate SS of the four columns in 1M rows:
1) Step 1: Padding. The first step is to pad each number of each
column with zeros. Hence, all numbers in a column contain
identical digits to prevent an adversary to know the distribution
of values. For example, after padding the value 1 of CK column
is represented as 0,000,001, since the maximum length of a value
in CK column was seven. Similarly, values of CN and MS were
padded. We did not pad NK values, since they took only one
digit.
2) Step 2: Unary representation. The second step is representing
each digit into a set of ten numbers, as mentioned in §2.1, having
only 0s or 1s. For example, 0,000,001 (one value of CK) was
converted into 70 numbers, having all zeros except the number
at 1st , 11th , 21st , 31st , 41st , 51st , and 62nd positions. Here,
a group of the first ten numbers shows the first digit, i.e., 0, a
group of 11th to 20th number shows the second digit, i.e., 0, and
so on. Similarly, each value of CN, NK, and MS was converted.
We also added RID column.
3) Step 3: Secret-share generation. The third step is used to creating
SS of the numbers, generated in step 2. We selected a polynomial
f(x) = secret value + a1x, where a1 was selected randomly
between 1 to 9M for each number, the modulus is chosen as
15,000,017, and x was varied from one to sixteen to obtain
sixteen shares of each value. Thus, we obtained [R]i, 1 ≤ i ≤
16. Recall that for matching a string of length l in one round, we
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Tuples Size (in GB)
Customer–1M 2.3
Customer–9M 21
Supplier–70K 0.1275
Supplier–670K 1.2
Customer–25 0.0000165
TABLE 13: Experiment. 1. Average size for shared data generation
by the DB owner (single threaded implementation).
need at least 2l + 1 shares, while using polynomials of degree
one, as mentioned in §3. Here, the largest string length is 7,
thus, we need at least 15 shares for count queries. However, for
selection queries based on RID , we need at least 16 shares. To
minimize query processing time for selection and join queries,
we add four more attributes corresponding to each of the four
attributes in Customer table. A value of each of the additional
four attributes has only one secret-shared value, created using
SSS (not after padding). But, one can also implement the same
query on secret-shared values obtained after step 2.
4) Step 4: Outsourcing the shares. We placed ith share of the
relation [R]i to ith AWS EMR cluster.
SS-Supplier and SS-Nation tables generation. The three
columns of Supplier table contain numbers: SK and SN: 1
to 70,000 (670,000 in 9M), NK: 1 to 25. The three columns
of Nation table contain numbers: NK and NE: 25 and RK: 1
to 5. We followed the same steps as followed on Customer
table, except the difference of padding the values with 0, that
has changed in according to the maximum length of a value in a
column.
Experiment 1: SS data generation time and size. Table 13
shows the average size of generated secret-shared Customer,
Supplier, and Nation tables, at the DB owner machine
using one-threaded implementation. Note that the dataset size is
increased as expected, due to unary representation. For example,
in 1M cleartext Customer table, CK column has 1M numbers,
which each took 32 bits, while a single value of CK column in SS
data took 32× 70 = 2240 bits.
Experiment 2: Performance test. We executed count, selection,
join, and range queries using the proposed algorithms. Figure 4
shows server processing time for each query on 1M and 9M rows
of Customer table and 25 rows of Nation table using a cluster
of size four. We will discuss query processing below.
Count queries. Figure 4 shows the time taken by a count query
on NK column of Customer table on 1M and 9M rows. Interest-
ingly for count queries, the increase in time is not proportional
to the increase in dataset size, since parallel processing using
multiple mappers on a cluster of size four reduced the computation
time significantly, resulting in the total execution time to reach
close to the time spent in the sequential part of the code, i.e., job
setup time and disk I/O time.
Selection queries. We executed algorithms for one tuple per
value, as well as, one-round and tree-based algorithms for fetching
multiple tuples. For one-tuple per value or single tuple selection
(STS), see Figure 4, we executed a selection query on CK column
of Customer table. The computation time with 9M rows is two
times more than the computation time on 1M rows. Furthermore,
single tuple selection involves almost 4 times more disk I/O which
cannot be made parallel by an increasing number of mappers.
For fetching multiple tuples, we used NK column of Customer
table, while limiting the number of retrieved tuples to be 100.
Figure 4 shows the time spent at servers for determining the tuple
address using one-round algorithm (MTS-1round) and tree-based
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Fig. 4: Experiment 2. Performance test on 1M and 9M rows.
algorithm (MTS-Tree). Note that the entire query execution time
of MTS-1round is less than MTS-Tree, since multiple rounds in
MTS-Tree consume more time at the servers due to scanning and
computing on the database many times. For MTS-Tree on 1M
rows, there were 7930, 12161 and 1211 blocks in Q&A rounds,
while block sizes were 128, 32 and 8, respectively. For MTS-Tree
on 9M rows, there were 75874, 115637 and 11325 blocks in the
Q&A rounds with block sizes of 128, 32 and 8 rows respectively.
After knowing tuple addresses using either MTS-1round or MTS-
Tree, the user retrieved 100 tuples, as shown in Figure 4 denoted
by ‘Fetch (100 rows).’ Note that the total processing time for
fetching 100 tuples using MTS-1round is the sum of time taken by
MTS-1round and Fetch (100 rows). Similarly, the total processing
time for fetching 100 tuples using MTS-Tree is the sum of time
taken by MTS-Tree and Fetch (100 rows).
Join queries. We executed PK/FK joins over Nation and
Customer tables on NK columns. Figure 4 shows the execu-
tion time for PK/FK based join query. For non-PK/FK join, we
considered NK column of Supplier and Customer tables.
The join is preceded by a selection, NK = 10, on Customer
and Supplier tables. We implemented this join query as a 3-
step process: (i) MTS-1round algorithm for finding the tuples
matching the selection condition (NK = 10) on both Customer
and Supplier tables. (ii) Fetching all the matching tuples using
the tuple fetch algorithm from both the tables. (iii) Execute a
Cartesian product on the tuples fetched from each table. However,
for executing non-PK/FK join, we used Supplier table of size
1000, 2000, and 3000, while Customer table was of size 10,000,
20,000, and 30,000; see Table 14. The reason for not executing
non-PK/FK join over 1M or 9M rows was that we need to first
fetch 40,000 or 360K tuples from 1M or 9M rows of Customer
table having NK = 10. Similarly, we need to first fetch 2800 or
26,800 tuples from 70K or 670K rows of Supplier table having
NK = 10. Finally, we need to execute Cartesian product over
40K × 2800 and 360K × 26.8K , which was taking more than
1 hour, which seems infeasible. Note that there is no work on
secret-shared join processing that can handle a non-PK/FK join
over 40K × 2800 or 360K × 26.8K rows. Thus, designing an
efficient algorithm for non-PK/FK join will be an interesting idea
in the future.
Customer Rows Supplier Rows Time
10000 1000 147s
20000 2000 200s
30000 3000 242s
TABLE 14: Experiment 2: Non-PK/FK join.
Range queries. We executed range-based count and range-based
selection queries on NK column of Customer table. For this
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Fig. 5: Experiment 3. Impact of the number of mappers on 1M rows.
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Fig. 6: Experiment 3. Impact of the number of mappers on 9M rows.
query, we outsource NK column of Customer table using binary-
representation, as mentioned in §4.4. Figure 4 shows the execution
time of the range-based count query. Further, the range-based
selection query took 51s and 81s for 1M and 9M rows respectively.
Experiment 3: Impact of mappers. The processing time at
the server can be reduced by an increasing number of mappers.
Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the execution time for each query
with an increasing number of mappers per node for 1M and 9M
rows, respectively. The execution time decreases for all queries
(except PK/FK join query) as the number of mappers increases.
PK/FK join is a reduce heavy computation, and hence, we will see
in the next experiment that as the number of reducers increases,
the computation time in the case of join query also decreases. Note
that in Figure 5 and Figure 6, the execution time does not decrease
much after increasing the numbers of mappers per node beyond 20
(also, for the smaller dataset, the execution time starts to increase).
This happens because the total execution time reaches close to the
time spent in the sequential part of the code and in the disk I/O.
Experiment 4: Impact of reducers. The processing time at the
server can be reduced by an increasing number of reducers as well.
Note that for queries that generate a single tuple as an output, e.g.,
count, range-based count, and single tuple selection queries, there
is only one unique key after the map phase. Thus, all the outputs
of the map phase are assigned to one reducer only. However,
in the case of a join query, reducers execute multiplication and
addition operations over all the tuples of both the relations to
compute the join outputs. Therefore, the execution time decreases
as the number of reducers increases; see Figure 7. However, in
the case of 1M rows, the execution time starts to increase after
increasing the number of reducers more than 16, due to the
increased overhead for maintaining multiple reducers per node.
Experiment 5: Impact of cluster size. The processing time at
the server can be reduced by an increasing the size of a cluster.
Figure 8 shows the server processing time of various queries with
increasing cluster size. An increase in the cluster size allows us
to increase the total number of mappers (or reducers), thereby
achieving more parallelism. Also, an increase in the cluster size
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Fig. 7: Exp. 5. Impact of the number of reducers on PK/FK join.
reduces I/O time, due to more available disks that support parallel
read and write. Observe that the execution time consistently
decreases as the cluster size increases; however, there is not much
reduction in the execution time between a cluster of size three and
a cluster of size four on 1M rows of Customer, since the increase
in parallelism is not able to reduce the execution time further as
the total execution time reaches the time spent in sequential part
of the program.
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Fig. 8: Experiment 5. Impact of the cluster size.
Experiment 6: Multi-tuple fetch. We also measured the com-
putation time at servers to fetch multiple tuples; see Figure 9.
Note that as we increase the number of tuples to be retrieved, the
computation time also increases, due to an increasing number of
multiplication and addition operations involved in string-matching
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Fig. 9: Exp. 6. Time for retrieving a different number of tuples.
Experiment 7: Reducing the size of secret-shared data using
hashing. As mentioned in §2.1, as the data contains long non-
numerals, it results in an increased size of secret-shared dataset.
For comparing secret-shared data of non-numerals with and with-
out using a hash function, we used Big-Data Benchmark [49]
Ranking table having 360K tuples and three attributes, namely
URL, PageRank, and Duration. URL attribute can be very long
with an average length of 55 characters. The use of unary rep-
resentation for creating secret-shares of long URLs increases the
dataset size significantly; see Table 15. Thus, to reduce the size of
secret-shared data, we used hashing before creating secret-shares
of URL attribute. We selected SHA1 [50] cryptographic hash
function to hash URL strings. Since Ranking table has 360K
unique URLs, a smaller length hashed value is sufficient to prevent
a collision. Thus, we used only the last eight digits of the hashed
URL. As a result, the size of the secret-shared data reduced from
4GB to 695MB after implementing the above-mentioned hashing
technique. Furthermore, we executed a count query on the hashed
data that shows less time as compared to executing the same query
on non-hash data, since executing operations on non-hashed data
require more number of multiplications and additions as compared
to the hashed data.
Hashing Without Hashing
Secret-shared dataset size 685MB 4GB
Count query (4 mappers) 34s 110s
Count query (16 mappers) 18s 25s
TABLE 15: Experiment 7. Impact of hashing.
Experiment 8: Impact of communication between user and
servers. We measured the communication impact on multi tuple
selection queries. For the count query, the output is just one
number, so the performance is not impacted by network com-
munication. In the case of a selection query based on one-round
algorithm, the user fetches the entire NK column of Customer
table from three servers. The size of NK column was 7.9MB in
1M rows and 71MB in 9M rows of Customer table. When using
slow (100MB/s), medium (500MB/s), and fast (1GB/s) speed of
data transmission, the data transmission time in case of 1M and
9M rows was negligible on all transmission speeds.
Experiment 9: User computation time. In the proposed al-
gorithms, the interpolation time in the case of count, range-
based count, and single tuple selection queries was less than
1s. However, in the case of a selection query using one-round
algorithm that requires interpolating all the values of the entire
NK column, the user-side interpolation time was 1s on 1M rows
and 7s on 9M rows. Recall that we are fetching at most 600
rows (Experiment 6 Figure 9), and therefore, the user needs to
generate shares corresponding to at most 600 RID values, which
took less than 1s. Further, as a result of the selection query, the
user interpolated 2400 values (600 rows, where each row with four
attribute values), and it took again less than 1s. Thus, we can see
that the user computation time during the entire selection query
was less than 2s on 1M and 8s on 9M rows. In the case of the
tree-based algorithm, the user needs to interpolate 8200, 31,720,
48,644 and 4846 numbers, for rounds with block sizes 128, 32, 8
and 2 respectively when the data contains 1M rows. With 9M rows
the user needs to interpolate 78,516, 303,496, 462,548 and 45,302
numbers for rounds with sizes 128, 32, 8 and 2, respectively. The
user spends at most 0.2s for 1M rows and 1.6s for 9M rows
on interpolation in any of the rounds. Observe that from this
experiment it is clear that the user processing time is significantly
less than the server processing time (given in Figure 4).
Experiment 10: Comparing against downloading scheme. We
also evaluated the queries for the case when a user downloads the
entire data, decrypts it, and then, executes a query. Decrypting the
completely non-deterministically encrypted Customer table took
24s and 238s for 1M and 9M rows, respectively, while loading
into MySQL database took 4s and 35s, respectively. Similarly,
decrypting the entirely non-deterministically encrypted Nation
table of 25 rows and loading it into MySQL took less than 1s.
On these datasets, executing any query took at most 2s and
12s for 1M rows and 9M rows, respectively (PK/FK join query
took the highest execution time). Note that it indicates that our
proposed algorithms at public servers are significantly better than a
trivial way of executing a query after downloading and decrypting
the data. Observe that the maximum computation time by our
proposed count, MTC-1-Round selection, and PK/FK-based join
algorithms was 56s on 1M and 239s on 9M rows; see Figure 4.
6 LEAKAGE ANALYSIS
This section provides a discussion on side-information leakages at
the servers due to query execution. We provide the adversarial
objective with respect to different queries, and then, discuss
leakages due to either query execution access-patterns (i.e., the
way tuples are scanned) or the output-size.
6.1 Count Query
In the count query, the adversarial objective is to know the
frequency-count of each value, i.e., the number of tuples having
the same value in an attribute of the relation, by observing the
query execution or output-size.
Query execution based leakage. The secret-shared count query
predicate is different from the secret-shared values of the desired
attribute on which the count query will be executed. Hence, the
adversary cannot deduce by just looking at the secret-shared query
and attribute values that which attribute value is identical to the
query predicate. In addition, the adversary cannot distinguish two
count queries, due to different polynomials used to create secret-
shares of two count queries. Also, the string-matching operation is
executed on all the values of the desired attribute, hence, access-
patterns are hidden.
Output-size-based leakage. The output of any count query, which
is of secret-shared form, is identical in terms of the number of bits
in our setting; hence, the adversary cannot know the exact count
and differentiate two count queries based on the output-sizes.
6.2 Selection Query
This section discusses leakages due to a selection query. Note
that, likewise a count query, in a selection query, the adversary
cannot deduce which attribute value is identical to the query
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predicate by just observing query or attribute values. Also, the
adversary cannot distinguish two selection query predicates, due
to different polynomials, used to create secret-shares. As we
proposed different algorithms for selection queries, below we
discuss information-leakage involved in each algorithm.
6.2.1 One Value One Tuple
In the case of one tuple per value based selection query, the
adversarial objective is to learn which tuple satisfies the query.
Query execution based leakage. Servers perform identical oper-
ations (i.e., string-matching on secret-shared values against the
query predicate and multiplication of the resultant with all values)
on each tuple of the relation, and finally, add all secret-shares of
each attribute. Hence, access-patterns are hidden and so obscuring
the tuple satisfying the query predicate from the adversary.
Output-size-based leakage. The output of the selection query,
which is of the form of secret-shares, is identical in terms of the
number of bits in secret-sharing, like the count query; hence, the
adversary cannot learn the desired tuple based on the final secret-
shared tuple sent to the user.
6.2.2 Multiple Values with Multiple Tuples
In the case of multiple tuples satisfying the selection query pred-
icate, the adversarial objective is to deduce which tuples satisfy
the query based on the access-patterns and the number of tuples
corresponding to the query.
Leakage discussion of one-round algorithm.
Query execution based leakage. The server performs identical
operations on all the tuples of the relation (i.e., (i) string-matching
operations on secret-shared attribute values and the selection query
predicate in the first round to know the desired tuple ids, and (ii)
string-matching operations on secret-shared tuple ids, RID , in the
second round to transmit the desired secret-shared tuples). Hence,
access-patterns are hidden, and so, the adversary cannot know
which tuples satisfy the selection query predicate.
Note that for fetching multiple tuples, the user sends a secret-
shared vector of some length, say `. However, by just observing
the vector, the adversary cannot learn that which ` tuples are
satisfying the query, since an ith element of the vector does not
indicate that the ith tuple is required by the user.
Output-size-based leakage. The number of output tuples (or the
output-size), however, can reveal the number of tuples satisfying
the selection query, which was hidden from the adversary before
the query execution. Here, if the adversary is aware of selection
predicates based on background knowledge, then the adversary
can execute frequency-count analysis, due to the number of
returned tuples. However, knowing a secret-shared selection pred-
icate is not a trivial task. A trivial way to overcome such an attack
is to download the entire database and execute the query at the
trusted user. However, such a solution incurs communication and
computation overheads. To the best of our knowledge, there is no
solution to prevent output-size attacks except sending fake tuples
to the user. Such solutions work for users who are willing to pay
a little bit higher communication cost, while preserving a desired
level of privacy. For example, Opaque [51] and ObliDB [52] that
send fake data to prevent output-size attacks.
We also adopt the same solution and request servers to send
more tuples than the desired tuples (in an oblivious manner).
Recall that the user sends a vector, having secret-secret row-ids,
to the server (§4.2.1). To prevent the output-size-based attack, the
user sends a vector of an identical length having some fake row-
ids, regardless of the number of tuples satisfying the selection
query predicate. Thus, the user retrieves an identical number of
tuples, regardless of the selection query predicate. Hence, the
adversary cannot learn which tuples satisfy the query, due to
preventing output-size attacks. In particular, due to hiding access-
patterns, an ith element of the vector does not reveal that either
the ith tuple is required by the user or the ith element of the vector
is a fake value (row-id).
Leakage discussion of tree-based algorithm.
Query execution based leakage. The server performs identical op-
erations, i.e., counting the tuples satisfying the selection predicate
in PHASE 0, partitioning the relation into certain blocks in PHASE
1, and transmission of tuples in PHASE 2 (using the algorithm for
one tuple per value §4.2.1), on all the tuples of the relation. Hence,
access-patterns are hidden, obscuring the selection predicate and
the tuple containing the predicate from the adversary.
In the tree-based search algorithm, the user requests servers
to partition the blocks into sub-blocks; see §4.2.2. However, to
improve efficiency, the user may request the server not to partition
the blocks satisfying either Case 1 (a block containing no tuple
satisfying the selection query predicate, p), Case 2 (a block
containing one/multiple tuples but only a single tuple contains p),
or Case 3 (a block containing h tuples, and all the h tuples contain
p); see §4.2.2. Thus, the user requests the server to partitions
those blocks that contain some h tuples, while all the h tuples
do not have p. Consequently, the adversary can deduce that which
blocks contain the desired tuples and which blocks do not contain
the desired tuples, without knowing the actual tuples. Thus, we
suggest partitioning all the blocks until we know the row-ids of all
the desired tuples or each block satisfies either Case 2 or Case 3.
Of course, it incurs the computational cost, as studied in §5.
Output-size-based leakage. This discussion is identical to the
discussion presented above for one-round algorithm.
6.3 Join Queries
§4.3 discussed PK/FK and non-PK/FK join algorithms. Here we
discuss information-leakages due to both algorithms.
Leakage discussion of PK/FK join.
Query execution based leakage. Each mapper performs identical
operations, i.e., generating key-value pairs of each tuple. Each
reducer also performs identical operations, i.e., string-matching
on secret-shared values of the joining attribute and multiplication
of the resultant by each tuple, and finally adds all the secret-shares
of each attribute. In addition, the dataflow between mappers and
reducers is identical, i.e., the number of key-value pairs produced
by a mapper and the number of key-value pairs allocated to a
reducer are same. Therefore, access-patterns are hidden from the
adversary, preventing the adversary from knowing which tuples of
the parent relation join with which tuples of the child relation.
However, the adversary can only know the identity of joining
attribute. For example, if R(A,B) and S(B,C) are two joining
relations, where B is the joining attribute, then the adversary will
only know that the second attribute of R and the first attribute of
S are the joining attributes. Note that the adversary will not learn
any value of the joining attribute, since they are secret-shared.
In most of the cases, the selection operation is pushed before
the join operation to faster the query processing may reveal
some information based on output-sizes of the selected tuples. To
prevent leakages from selection query, we first select real tuples
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with some fake tuples, as mentioned in §6.2.2, and then, execute
the join algorithm on both real and fake tuples.
Output-size-based leakage. The outputs of the reducers, which is
of the form of secret-shares, is identical in terms of the number of
bits; hence, the adversary cannot deduce any relationship between
any two tuples of the two relations.
Leakage discussion of non-PK/FK joins.
Query execution based leakage. In the oblivious non-PK/FK
equijoin approach, the servers may know the number of joining
tuples per value in both relations and the number of joining values
by observing data transmission. Our approach can prevent the
adversary from knowing the number of joining tuples per value
and the number of joining values, by executing the join algorithm
on some extra fake tuples, which actually do not produce any
real output while preventing the information leakage. Particularly,
for each joining value, the first layer servers obliviously send
an identical number of tuples to the second layer servers. Thus,
the adversary cannot know an exact number of joining tuples per
value. Further, the same operation can be carried out for any fake
joining value to prevent revealing the number of joining values.
However, both the steps incur computational and communication
overheads.
Output-size-based leakage. Naive execution of non-PK/FK algo-
rithm, i.e., without executing algorithm on fake tuples per joining
value, provide a rough estimate to the adversary to know the
number of tuples having common joining values in both the rela-
tion, due to different-sized outputs. However, as mentioned above,
executing non-PK/FK for fake tuples can completely overcome
output-sized-based attacks.
6.4 Range Query
Existing encryption-based [53] or order-preserving secret-
shared [23] approaches for a range search reveal the order of the
values. Since we are outsourcing each value of the form of secret-
shares created by using different polynomials, our approach does
not reveal any order of the value, unlike [23], [53].
Query execution based leakage. The server executes an identical
operation, regardless of range values. Hence, the adversary cannot
learn the exact range values and the tuples satisfying the range
query by observing string-matching operations, which hide access-
patterns.
Output-size-based leakage. In range-based count queries, the ad-
versary cannot estimate the number of qualified tuples to range
query, since the output for each range-based count query is iden-
tical. However, in the case of range-based selection queries, the
adversary may estimate the query range based on the output-size
and background knowledge. For example, consider an employee
relation and two queries: (i) find details of employees having age
between 18-21, and (ii) find details of employees having age be-
tween 22-75. The output-sizes of the two queries are significantly
different. Hence, the adversary can trivially distinguish such two
range queries. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no
technique to prevent such an attack without executing range-based
selection query for fake values, and then, filter non-desired tuples
at the user, as we suggested in a simple selection query (§6.2.2).
6.5 Information Leakage to the User
In our selection queries for multiple tuples and non-PK/FK join
algorithms, the user knows the addresses of the qualifying tuples
to the query. Since users are trusted (as per our assumption), this
knowledge does not violate data privacy.
There are two models that can support untrusted users, at
different leakages/assumptions. In the first model, all the queries
are submitted to the DB owner, who executes the query at the
servers on behalf of the user, and then, returns the exact answers
to the user. Here, the user will not learn anything except the desired
output; however, the DB owner learns the user query. Unlike this
model, in our model, the DB owner will not learn the query.
In the second model, a trusted proxy is deployed at a different
server than the servers hosting secret-shares. The proxy replaces
the role of the DB owner for answering queries (unlike the first
model) and provides the exact answers to untrusted users.10 Note
that having a trusted proxy does not change any of our proposed
algorithms. Further, note that the assumption of having a trusted
proxy at the public servers is also considered in the previous
systems such as Arx [54] and PPGJ [55]. Observe that the second
model, where the trusted proxy learns the user query, is similar to
the first model from the data privacy perspective. To the best of
our knowledge, there is no work on secret-sharing that assumes
untrusted users that can execute their queries at the server without
involving either the DB owner or a trusted proxy.
To completely prevent any type of information leakage to
the user, we may use an approach, where the database owner
outsources unique random RID values (in a range 1 to x, where
x ≥ n) of secret-shared form (instead of sequential RID values
as shown in Figure 3), along with a permutation function. After
matching the query predicate over each ith (1 ≤ i ≤ n) value of
the desired attribute, the server multiplies the ith string-matching
resultant with ith RID value, and it results in a vector of length n.
Then, the server permutes all the n values of the vector and sends
them to the user. After interpolation, the user obtains a vector of n
values that contains the desired RID values with some zeros. Now,
the user creates secret-shares of the RID values with some fake
RID values that are larger than x to retrieve the desired tuples.
Thus, in this case, the user will also not learn anything about the
position of the desired tuples.
7 COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
This section presents the complexity analysis of different algo-
rithms. For all the following theorems, we use the following
notations: Let n and m be the number of tuples and attributes in a
relation, respectively. Let w be the maximum bit length (according
to our unary data representation as mentioned in §2.1).
Theorem 1 (Count Query) For the count operation, the com-
munication cost is O(1), the computational cost at the server is
O(nw), and the computational cost at the user is O(1).
Proof. Since a user sends a predicate of bit lengthw and receives c
values from the servers, the communication cost is constant that is
O(1). The server works on a specific attribute containing n values,
each of bit length w; hence, the computational cost at a server is at
most O(nw). The user only performs Lagrange interpolation on
the received c values from the servers; hence, the computational
cost at the user is also constant, O(1). 
Theorem 2 (Selection Query: One Value One Tuple) For se-
lection operation where only a single tuple can have the search-
ing predicate, the communication cost is at most O(mw), the
computational cost at a server is at most O(nmw), and the
computational cost at the user is at most O(mw).
10. The communication channels between the proxy and the majority of the
servers follow the same restriction like the communication channels between
the user and the majority of the server, as mentioned in §2.3.
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Proof. The user sends a selection predicate of bit length w and
receives c secret-shares and, eventually, a tuple containing m
attributes of size at most mw. Thus, the communication cost is
at most O(mw) bits. The server, first, counts the occurrences of
the predicate in a specific attribute containing n values, and then,
again, performs a similar operation on the n tuples, multiplying
the resultant by each m values of bit length at most w. Hence, the
computational cost at the server is O(nmw). The user performs
the interpolation on c values (the output of count query) to
know the occurrences of the predicate, and then, again, performs
the interpolation on c tuples containing m attributes. Thus, the
computational cost at the user is O(mw). 
Theorem 3 (Selection Query: One-round Algorithm) Let ` >
1 be the number of tuples containing a searching predicate p.
After obtaining the addresses of the desired tuples containing a
predicate, p, the fetch operation of the desired tuples results in the
following cost: the communication cost is O(n+ `mw), the com-
putational cost at a server is O(`nmw), and the computational
cost at the user is O(n + `mw).
Proof. In the first round of the one-round algorithm, the user
receives n secret-shares of a particular attribute. In the second
round, the user sends a vector having ` row-ids each of at most
w bits and receives ` tuples, each of size at most mw. Thus, the
maximum number of bits flow is O(n+ `mw). Mappers perform
string-matching operations on n secret-shares of a particular
attribute in the first round, then, string-matching on RID attribute
in the second round, and multiply the string-matching resultant
to the remaining secret-shared values of the tuple. Hence, the
computational cost at the server is O(`nmw). The computational
cost at the user is O(n + `mw), since the user works on the n
secret-shares of a specific attribute, creates a vector of length ` in
the first round and, then, works on ` tuples containing m values,
each of size at most w bits. 
Theorem 4 (Selection Query: Tree-based Algorithm) Let ` >
1 be the number of tuples containing a searching predicate p. The
number of rounds for obtaining addresses of tuples containing
a selection predicate, p, using tree-based search (Algorithm 4)
is at most blog` nc + blog2 `c + 1, and the communication
cost for obtaining such addresses is O((log` n + log2 `)`). The
computational cost at a server is O((log` n + log2 `)`nw), and
the computational cost at the user is O((log` n + log2 `)`).
Proof. In each round of Q&A of tree-based algorithm, the user
obtains the number of occurrences of p in each block. If the
block contains zero or one occurrence, then the user can know
the tuple-id. However, if there are some blocks containing more
than one occurrence of p, the user asks the servers to partition
these blocks into ` sub-blocks. After ith round of Q&A, each sub-
block contains at most n`i tuples. Therefore, it is clear that afterblog` nc rounds, the number of tuples contained in each block
is less than n
`blog` nc < `. At this time, there may be some blocks
still contain more than one tuple having p. Similarly, we split these
blocks until all the sub-blocks contain only one/zero occurrence
of p. It requires at most blog2 `c rounds of Q&A. Finally, it may
need one more round for obtaining the tuple-ids of desired tuples.
Thus, the Q&A round is at most blog` nc+ blog2 `c+ 1.
Note that for each round, there may be at most `2 blocks
containing more than two occurrences, which indicate that at
most `2 blocks need further partitioning. Thus, in every Q&A
round (except the first round), the server only needs to perform
count operation for `2 sub-blocks and sends the results to the
user. When the server finishes partitioning all the sub-blocks, it
may need to determine the tuple-ids, which require at most `
words transmission between the server and the user. Therefore,
the communication cost is O((log` n + log2 `) · `).
A server performs count operation in each round; hence, the
computational cost at the server is O((log` n + log2 `)`nw). In
each round, the user performs the interpolation for obtaining the
occurrences of p in each block; hence, the computational cost at
the user-side is at most O((log` n + log2 `) · `). 
Example. In figure 2, in order to fetch tuples containing p, the user
needs 4 rounds (include the last fetch round), which is smaller than
blog2 9c+ blog2 2c+ 1 = 5.
Theorem 5 (PK-FK Joins) For performing PK/FK join of two
relations X and Y , where each relation is having n tuples and
each tuple of the parent relation joins with one tuple of the child
relation, the communication cost is O(nmw), the computational
cost at a server is O(n2mw), and the computational cost at the
user is O(nmw).
Proof. Since the user receives the whole relation of n tuples and
at most 2m − 1 attributes, the communication cost is O(nmw),
and due to the interpolation on the n tuples, the computational
cost at the user is O(nmw). A reducer compares each value of
the joining attribute of the relation Y with all n values of the
joining attribute of the relation X , and it results in at most n2
comparisons. Further, the output of the comparison is multiplied
by m − 1 attributes of the corresponding tuple of the relation Y .
Hence, the computational cost at a server is O(n2mw). 
Theorem 6 (Non-PK/FK Joins) Let X and Y be two relations.
Let k be the number of identical values of the joining attribute in
the relations, and let ` be the maximum number of occurrences of a
joining value. For performing non-PK/FK equijoin of two relations
X and Y , the number of rounds isO(2k), the communication cost
is O(2nwk + 2k`2mw), the computational cost at a server is
O(`2kmw), and the computational cost at the user is O(2nw +
2k`2mw).
Proof. Since there are at most k identical values of the joining
attribute in both relations and all the k values can have a different
number of occurrences in the relations, the user has to send at most
2k matrices (following an approach of the one-round algorithm for
fetching multiple tuples §4.2.1) in O(2k) rounds.
The user sends at most 2k matrices, each of n rows and
of size at most w; hence, the user sends O(2knw) bits. Since
at most ` tuples have an identical value of the joining attribute
in one relation, equijoin provides at most `2 tuples. The user
receives at most `2 tuples for each k value having at most 2m− 1
attributes; hence, the user receives O(2k`2mw) bits. Therefore,
the communication cost is O(2nwk + 2k`2mw) bits.
The server of the first layer executes the one-round algorithm
for fetching multiple tuples for all k values of both relations having
2n tuples; hence the servers of the first layer performs O(2nkw)
computation. In the second layer, a server performs an equijoin
(or concatenation) of at most ` tuples for each k value; thus, the
computational cost at the server is O(`2kmw).
The user first interpolates at most 2n values of bit length
w of the joining attribute, and then, interpolates k`2 tuples
containing at most 2m − 1 attributes of bit length w. Therefore,
the computational cost at the user is O(2nw + 2k`2mw). 
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8 CONCLUSION
The database outsourcing to public servers is a prominent solution
to deal with a resource-constrained database owner and avoid over-
heads for maintaining and executing queries at the database owner.
However, the public servers do not ensure security and privacy of
data/computation. The modern data processing frameworks such
as Hadoop or Spark, which are designed for a trusted environment,
do not deal with security and privacy of data and computations.
This paper presented information-theoretically secure data and
computation outsourcing techniques, especially, algorithms for
count, selection, projection, join, and range queries, while using
MapReduce as an underlying programming model. The techniques
are designed in a way that a heavy computation is executed at
the servers instead of the user, without revealing the query to the
server or the database owner. We experimentally evaluated our
proposed algorithms on 1M and 9M rows of TPC-H benchmark
using AWS servers. Experimental results show that our algorithms
are better than a trivial way of executing queries after downloading
and decrypting the entire data at the user.
Future directions. The algorithms proposed in this paper should
be considered in different domains. For example, an interesting
direction may focus on the data outsourcing model, where an
untrusted user executes queries on the secret-shared data without
involving either the database owner or a trusted-third-party, and
the user receives only the desired output. Another interesting
direction may focus on malicious adversaries, while not using any
Byzantine fault-tolerant protocol. Such algorithms should also be
information-theoretically secure and may allow an untrusted user
to verify the result of their queries without involving a third-party
(e.g., the database owner). Nevertheless, designing algorithms for
these new models should also prevent access-patterns- and output-
size-based attacks to achieve complete data privacy.
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APPENDIX
Algorithm 1: Algorithm for creating secret-shares
Inputs:R: a relation having n tuples and m attributes, c: the number of
non-communicating servers
Variables: letter : represents a letter
1 Function create secret-shares(R) begin
2 for (i, j) ∈ (n,m) do
3 foreach letter [i, j] doMake shares(letter [i, j ])
4 Function Make shares(letter [i, j ]) begin
5 x← length of letter [i, j]
6 Create x unary-vectors, where the position of the letter has value 1 and all
the other values are 0
7 Use x polynomials of an identical degree for creating secret-shares of 0 and
1
8 Send secret-shares to c servers
Algorithm 2: Algorithm for privacy-preserving count
queries
Inputs: R: a relation of the form of secret-shares having n tuples and m
attributes, p: a counting predicate, c: the number of servers, vi: an ith value,
and Len(vi): length of vi.
Output: fcount : the number of occurrences of p
Interfaces: attribute(p): which attribute of the relation has to be searched for
p
Variables: int resulti : the output at ith server after executing the map function
Notation: : string-matching operations
User:
1 Compute secret-shares of p: p′ ← Make shares(p) // Algorithm 1
2 Send p′,m′ ← attribute(p) to c servers
Server i:
3 int resulti ← MAP count(p′,m′)
4 Send int resulti back to the user
User:
5 result[i]← int resulti, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , c}
6 Compute the final output: fcount ← Interpolate(result[])
7 Function MAP count(p′,m′) begin
8 for r ∈ (1, n) do
STEP 1r: Nr1 = m
′[[vr]1] [p′]1
STEP 2r: Nr2 = m
′[[vr]2] [p′]2
...
STEP Len(vr )r: NrLen(vr ) = m
′[[vr]Len(vr )] [p′]Len(vr )
STEP (Len(vr ) + 1)r:
count = count + Nr1 ×Nr2 × . . .×NrLen(vr )
9 return(count)
Count query — Algorithm 2’s pseudocode description.
1. The user creates secret-shares of p (see line 1), sends them along
with the attribute identity (m′, on which the servers will execute
the count query) to c servers (see line 2).
2. The server executes a map function (line 8) that reads each value
of the form of secret-share of the m′ attribute, executes string-
matching, and produces the final secret-shared output (line 9).
3. The user interpolates the received results from the servers and
obtains an answer to the count query (line 6).
Selection query for one tuple per value — Algorithm 3’s
pseudocode description.
1. The user executes Algorithm 2 for counting occurrences, say `,
of p; line 1.
2. If ` is one, the user sends secret-shares of p and the attribute,
say m′, where p occurs, to c servers; line 3.
3. Each server executes a map function that
a. Executes string-matching on the ith value of the m′ attribute
(line 9), and this provides a value, say temp, either 0 or 1 of
the form of secret-shares. Then, it multiplies temp by all the
attribute values of the ith tuples; line 10.
Algorithm 3: Algorithm for privacy-preserving selection
queries in the case of one tuple per value
Inputs: R, n, m, p, and c are defined in Algorithm 2
Output: A tuple t containing p
Variables: `: the number of occurrences of p
int result searchi : the output at a server i after fetching a single tuple in a
privacy-preserving manner
result search[]: an array to store outputs of all the servers
Interfaces: attribute(p): which attribute of the relation has to be searched for
p
User:
1 Compute secret-shares of p: p′ ← Make shares(p)
Send p′ and m′ ← attribute(p) to c servers to execute Algorithm 2 for
obtaining the number of occurrences (`) of p
2 if ` > 1 then Execute Algorithm 4
3 else Send p′ and m′ ← attribute(p) to c servers
Server i:
4 int result searchi ← MAP single tuple fetch(p′,m′)
5 Send int result searchi back to the user
User:
6 result search[i]← int result search[i], ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , c}
7 Obtain the tuple t ← Interpolate(result search[])
8 Function MAP single tuple fetch(p′,m′) begin
9 for i ∈ (1, n) do
temp ← string matching(m′[[vi]] [p′]) // Likewise
Algorithm 2
10 for j ∈ (1,m) do temp × Ri[∗, j]
11 for (j, i) ∈ (m,n) do Sj ← add all the shares of jth attribute
12 return(S1||S2|| . . . ||Sm)
b. When the above step is completed on all the n secret-shared
tuples, it adds all the secret-shares of each attribute; line 11.
c. Each server sends the sum of each attribute’s secret-shares to
the user; line 12.
4. The user receives c secret-shared tuples and interpolates them
to obtain the desired tuple; line 7.
Algorithm 4: Tree-based algorithm for privacy-preserving
selection queries in the case of multiple values having tuples.
Inputs: R, n, m, p, and c are defined in Algorithm 2
Outputs: Tuples containing p
Variables: `: the number of occurrences of p
int result block counti [j]: at ith server to store the number of occurrences
of the form of secret-shares in jth block
result block count[]: at the user to store the count of occurrences of p of the
form of secret-shares in each block at each server
count[]: at the user to store the count of occurrences of p in each block
Address[]: stores the addresses of the desired tuples
User:
1 Compute secret-shares of p: p′ ← Make shares(p) and execute Algorithm 2
for obtaining the number of occurrences (`) of p
2 if ` = 1 then Execute Steps 3 to 7 of Algorithm 3
3 else Send p′, m′ ← attribute(p), ` to c servers
Server i:
4 Partition R into ` equal blocks, where each block contains h = n` tuples
5 int result block counti [j ]← Execute MAP count(p′,m′) jth block,
∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , `}
6 Send int result block counti [j ] back to the user
User:
7 result block count[i, j]← int result block counti [j],
∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , c}, ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , `}
8 Compute count[j ]← Interpolate(result block count[i, j ])
9 if count[j ] /∈ {0, 1, h} then
Question the servers about jth block and send 〈p′, count[j ],m′, j〉 to
servers
10 Fetch the tuples whose addresses are known using the one-round algorithm
Server i:
11 if Receive 〈p′, count[j ],m′, j〉 then Perform Steps 4 to 6 to jth block
recursively
Tree-based selection query — Algorithm 4’s pseudocode de-
scription. A user creates secret-shares of p and obtains the number
of occurrences, `; see line 1. When the occurrences ` = 1, we can
perform Algorithm 3 for fetching the only tuple having p; see
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line 2. When the occurrences ` > 1, the user needs to know the
addresses of all the ` tuples contain p. Thus, the user requests to
partition the input split/relation to ` blocks, and hence, sends ` and
p of the form of secret-shares to the servers; see line 3.
The mappers partition the whole relation or input split into `
blocks, perform privacy-preserving count operations in each block,
and send all the results back to the user; see lines 4 - 6. The user
interpolates the results and knows the number of occurrences of
p in each block; see line 8. Based on the number of occurrences
of p in each block, the user decides which block needs further
partitioning, and there are four cases, as follows:
1) The block contains no occurrence of p: it is not necessary to
handle this block.
2) The block contains only one tuple containing p: in this case,
the user can execute Algorithm 3.
3) The block contains h tuples and each h tuple contains p:
directly know the addresses, i.e., all the h tuples are required
to fetch.
4) The block contains h tuples and more than one, but less than h
tuples contain p: we cannot know the addresses of these tuples.
Hence, the user recursively requests to partition that block and
continues the process until the sub-blocks satisfy the above-
mentioned Case 2 or Case 3; see line 9.
When the user obtains the addresses of all the tuples containing
p, she fetches all the tuples using a method described for the one-
round algorithm; see line 10.
Algorithm 5: Algorithm for privacy-preserving range-based
count query
Inputs: R, n, m, and c: defined in Algorithm 2, [a, b]: a searching range
Output: fcount : the number of occurrence in [a, b]
Variables: int resulti : is initialized to 0 and the output at ith server after
executing the MAP range count function
User:
1 Compute secret-shares of a, b: a′ ← Make shares(a),
b′ ← Make shares(b)
2 Send a′, b′,m′ ← attribute(a) to c servers
Server i:
3 for i ∈ (1, n) do
int resulti ← int resulti + MAP range count(a′, b′,m′[[vi]])
4 Send int resulti back to the user
User:
5 result[i]← int resulti, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , c}
6 fcount ← n− Interpolate(result[])
7 Function MAP range count(a′, b′,m′[[vi ]]) begin
8 op1 ← SS -SUB(m′[[vi]], a′) // Algorithm 6
9 op2 ← SS -SUB(b′,m′[[vi]]) // Algorithm 6
10 return(op1 + op2)
Range-based Count Query — Algorithm 5’s pseudocode de-
scription. A user creates secret-shares of the range numbers a, b
and sends them to c servers; see lines 1 and 2. The server executes
a map function that checks each number in an input split by
implementing Algorithm 6; see lines 3 and 7. The map function;
see line 7, provides 0 (of the form of secret-share) if x ∈ [a, b];
otherwise, 1 (of the form of secret-share). The server provides the
number of occurrences (of the form of secret-shares) of tuples that
do not belong in the ranges to the user; see line 4. The user receives
all the values from servers and interpolates them; see lines 5 and 6.
Since the obtained interpolated answer indicates the number of
tuples that do not satisfy the range condition, subtracting it from
n provides the final answer to the range-based count query.
Algorithm 6: SS -SUB(A,B): 2’s complement-based sub-
traction of secret-sharing
Inputs: A = [at−1at−2 . . . a1a0], B = [bt−1bt−2 . . . b1b0] where ai, bi
are secret-shares of bits of 2’s complement represented number, t: the length of
A and B in the binary form
Outputs: rbt−1: the sign bit of B − A
Variable: carry[]: to store the carry for each bit addition
rb: to store the result for each bit addition
1 a0 ← 1− a0 // Invert of the LSB of A
2 carry[0]← a0 + b0 − a0 · b0
3 rb0 ← a0 + b0 − 2 · carry[0] // a¯0 + b0 + 1
4 for i ∈ (i, t− 1) do
ai ← 1− ai // invert each bit A→ A¯
rbi ← ai + bi − 2aibi
carry[i]← aibi + carry[i− 1] · rbi // The carry bit
rbi+ = carry[i− 1]− 2 · carry[i− 1] · rbi
5 return(rbt−1) // The sign bit of B − A
